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I. INTRODUCTION
Allocation of environmental cleanup costs among responsible par-
ties is a key component of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), also known as
Superfund. 1 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has expressly
acknowledged its importance 2 and twice within the past three terms
has grappled with how responsible parties3 may bring CERCLA
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
2. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 170 (2004).
3. The term "responsible party," as used in this article, refers to parties who would
be subject to liability if sued under CERCLA § 107 or under RCRA
§§ 7002(a)(1)(B) or 7003 with respect to contamination at a site, irrespective of
whether they have been sued or found liable yet. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a),
6972(a)(1)(B), 6973(a) (2000). Under CERCLA § 107, there are four categories of
responsible parties who are subject to liability for releases or threatened releases
of hazardous substances from a facility: current owners or operators of the facil-
ity; past owners or operators at the time hazardous substances were disposed of
at the facility; generators or others who arranged for the disposal of hazardous
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claims, for contribution or otherwise, to force other responsible parties
to share responsibility for cleanup costs at contaminated sites.4 While
some questions remain to be answered around the edges, it is once
again fairly clear that a responsible party who is subject to joint and
several liability for cleanup costs has a statutory claim under CER-
CLA by which he can require other responsible parties to bear their
equitable shares of the cleanup burden.5 Thus, because a CERCLA
defendant can bring actions for contribution or cost recovery, he may
not have to shoulder the entire cleanup burden himself, while other
responsible parties avoid liability entirely, just because he had the
misfortune of being the one responsible party sued. In addition to pro-
viding a whiff of fairness in the Superfund program, the availability of
contribution and cost recovery claims by responsible parties is widely
credited with promoting settlements and encouraging cleanups of con-
taminated sites by private parties while preserving governmental
resources. 6
The "imminent hazard" provisions of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA),7 like CERCLA, are used to force responsi-
ble parties to bear the costs of cleaning up contaminated sites. Sec-
tions 7003 and 7002(a)(1)(B) authorize the United States and citizens,
respectively, to require responsible parties to clean up wastes which
may present an "imminent and substantial endangerment" to health
or the environment.8 Defendants in RCRA imminent hazard cases,
like CERCLA defendants, generally are subject to strict, retroactive
and joint and several liability. 9 But unlike in CERCLA cases, virtu-
ally without exception courts have ruled that defendants in RCRA im-
minent hazard cases do not have a claim under RCRA, for
contribution or otherwise, by which they can seek to force other re-
sponsible parties to share the cleanup responsibility.1o
substances at the facility; and transporters of hazardous substances to the facil-
ity. Id. § 9607(a)(1)-(4). Under RCRA §§ 7002(a)(1)(B) or 7003, responsible par-
ties are those who have contributed or are contributing to the past or present
handling of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment. Id. §§ 6972(a)(1)(B),
6973(a).
4. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007); Cooper, 543 U.S.
157.
5. Atd. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2336-39.
6. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 59, 80 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2841, 2862; Brief for Natural Resources Defense Council et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, at 28-30, Atd. Research, 127 S. Ct.
2331 (No. 06-562).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
8. Id. §§ 6972(a)(1)(B), 6973(a).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Ottati & Goss Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1396-1403
(D.N.H. 1985) (discussing RCRA § 7003 and CERCIA).
10. See infra Part IV.
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By way of illustration, assume a site is contaminated with solvents
and presents a threat to health and the environment. The United
States, pursuant to CERCLA section 107,11 sues Millie, one of many
persons who contributed to the solvent contamination at the site, to
obtain a judgment making Millie responsible for the costs of cleaning
up the site contamination. Millie, pursuant to CERCLA, may file a
third-party complaint against other persons responsible for the sol-
vent contamination at the site (e.g., the former site operator, others
who generated and disposed of solvents there), and obtain contribu-
tion from those other responsible parties for their fair shares of the
site cleanup costs.12 Secure in the knowledge that she will be able to
recoup at least a portion of her costs from other responsible parties via
her CERCLA contribution claim, Millie settles with the government
and proceeds to perform the necessary cleanup work.
Now assume that the United States chooses to proceed against Mil-
lie under RCRA section 7003 instead of CERCLA. The government
files suit, seeking to require her to clean up the contamination at the
site. According to the prevailing view, 13 Millie is not allowed to seek
contribution under RCRA from other persons who contributed to the
contamination, even though they too would be liable to the govern-
ment under RCRA section 7003. Millie might be able to shift some of
her costs to other responsible parties by asserting a claim under CER-
CLA section 107, though the U.S. Supreme Court has not answered
this question yet.14 But if we assume that the site is contaminated
with gasoline or fuel oil instead of solvents, clearly no CERCLA claim
would be available due to CERCLA's petroleum exclusion.15 So Millie
is left facing the prospect of shouldering the entire cleanup burden
11. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
12. See id. § 9613(f)(1) (2000); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc., 543 U.S. 157
(2004).
13. See infra Part IV.
14. In United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007), the plaintiff
was a responsible party which "voluntarily" incurred cleanup costs, and the
Court held that such a responsible party could maintain an action for cost recov-
ery under CERCLA section 107. The Court indicated that a responsible party
which was compelled to incur cleanup costs as a result of a CERCLA case would
be entitled to recover those costs, pursuant to CERCLA sections 107, 113(f), or
both. 127 S. Ct. at 2338 n.6. The Atlantic Research Court did not squarely ad-
dress whether a responsible party forced to incur cleanup costs pursuant to other
authority, such as RCRA's imminent hazard provisions, would have a claim
under CERCLA against other responsible parties to recover those costs. See
Craig N. Johnston, United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.: The Supreme Court
Restores Voluntary Cleanups Under CERCLA, 22 J. ENvTL. L. & LITIG. 313,
335-40 (2007) (discussing issues unresolved by Atlantic Research, including
whether a party compelled to clean up a site under state law or federal law other
than CERCLA has a claim under CERCLA against other responsible parties).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2000) ("hazardous substance" excludes petroleum, includ-
ing crude oil and any fraction thereof).
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alone. Bereft of better legal options, Millie vigorously defends against
the United States' RCRA section 7003 claim, because otherwise she is
assured of bearing the entire cost of cleanup herself. The United
States incurs more litigation expense, and cleanup of the site is
delayed, unless the government dips further into the treasury and un-
dertakes the cleanup itself.
Why have courts taken a different path in RCRA imminent hazard
cases than in CERCLA cases when determining whether to allow a
defendant to assert a contribution claim against other parties respon-
sible for the site contamination? In general, courts have cited two rea-
sons. One, RCRA, unlike CERCLA, does not expressly provide for
contribution, and courts have invoked U.S. Supreme Court precedents
that disallowed implied contribution claims under certain other fed-
eral statutes to disallow an implied contribution claim under RCRA.
Two, courts have construed the Supreme Court's 1996 decision in
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc. ,16 which prohibited a private party from
recovering past cleanup costs under RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B), as
foreclosing a defendant from asserting a claim in the nature of contri-
bution against other responsible parties under RCRA section
7002(a)(1)(B).17
In light of the Supreme Court's decision last year in United States
v. Atlantic Research Corp.18 that once again makes cost allocation
claims among responsible parties broadly available under CERCLA,
this Article re-examines the prevailing view that contribution claims
should not be available to defendants in RCRA imminent hazard
cases. In short, this Article concludes that the refusal to recognize
contribution claims in RCRA imminent hazard cases is both bad law
and bad policy. Part II highlights RCRA's imminent hazard provi-
sions, including their similarities to CERCLA. Because multiple par-
ties can be subject to liability for the same contaminated site under
RCRA's imminent hazard provisions, Part III explores joint and sev-
eral liability and how the common law and CERCLA generally permit
defendants to assert contribution claims against other responsible
parties. Part IV shows that, by contrast, courts generally have re-
fused to recognize a claim for contribution by defendants in RCRA im-
minent hazard cases.
Part V ultimately concludes that RCRA section 7003 authorizes a
claim for contribution in governmental imminent hazard suits, im-
pliedly and as a matter of federal common law, and that RCRA section
7002(a)(1)(B) expressly provides a remedy in the nature of contribu-
tion in RCRA imminent hazard citizen suits. En route, this Article
not only finds Congressional intent to allow contribution for defend-
16. 516 U.S. 479 (1996).
17. See infra Part IV.
18. 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007).
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ants in RCRA section 7003 cases, but also detects a flaw in the Su-
preme Court's test for implying contribution under federal statutes
and taps the roots of contribution to propose a refined approach. Us-
ing the Court's recent CERCLA decision in Atlantic Research as a
prism, this Article demonstrates how RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) ex-
pressly authorizes contribution, notwithstanding the Court's earlier
decision in Meghrig. Additionally, this Article shows how courts fall
prey to the "one-Congress fiction," by focusing on the presence of an
express contribution provision in CERCLA and the absence of such an
express provision in RCRA, to the exclusion of more telling indicia of
statutory interpretation. A defendant's ability to force other responsi-
ble parties to share the cleanup load should not depend on whether a
plaintiff, governmental or private, chose to sue under CERCLA rather
than RCRA. If a contribution remedy in RCRA imminent hazard
cases were recognized, it would promote fairness, settlements and pri-
vate party cleanups. Part VI goes on to suggest a framework for ad-
dressing issues likely to arise in the context of contribution claims
among responsible parties in RCRA imminent hazard cases.
II. RCRA'S IMMINENT HAZARD PROVISIONS
Congress enacted the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act in
1976.19 Acting in the wake of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts
earlier in the decade, 20 Congress optimistically declared that RCRA
"eliminates the last remaining loophole in environmental law, that of
unregulated land disposal of discarded materials and hazardous
waste."2 1 RCRA, and regulations promulgated thereunder, establish
a cradle-to-grave tracking and management system for hazardous
waste, setting standards for generators, transporters, and treatment,
storage and disposal facilities, as well as establishing a permit system
to enforce such standards. 22 The statute, though, is not exclusively
focused on managing and regulating hazardous waste. RCRA's scope
19. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976). RCRA technically was enacted as an
amendment to the Solid Waste Disposal Act. Id. RCRA is now codified at Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000 & Supp. V
2005).
20. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 (Clean Air Act), Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat.
1676 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000)); Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act), Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000)).
21. H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at 4 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6241.
22. The EPA first issued hazardous waste regulations under RCRA in 1980. Hazard-
ous Waste Management System, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,066 (May 19, 1980) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pt. 260). Subtitle C of RCRA governs hazardous waste
management, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939, and RCRA's hazardous waste regulations
are now codified at 40 C.F.R. parts 260-272 (2007).
2008]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
also includes "solid waste," of which hazardous waste is a subset,
23
and the statute's imminent hazard provisions are designed to protect
health and the environment by effectuating the prompt cleanup of
contaminated sites by those who contributed to the contamination.
24
A. Section 7003 Governmental Actions
Section 7003 of RCRA25 provides the United States Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) with substantial power to require the
cleanup of sites contaminated with hazardous or solid wastes. As part
of the statute as originally enacted in 1976, and amended in 1980 and
1984,26 section 7003 authorizes the EPA to sue any person who has
contributed to, or is contributing to, the presence of any solid or haz-
ardous waste that may present an imminent and substantial endan-
germent to health or the environment. Section 7003 provides, in
pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, upon receipt of evidence
that the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation or dispo-
sal of any solid waste or hazardous waste may present an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to health or the environment, the Administrator may
bring suit on behalf of the United States in the appropriate district court
against any person (including any past or present generator, past or present
transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or
disposal facility) who has contributed or who is contributing to such handling,
storage, treatment, transportation or disposal to restrain such person from
such handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal, to order such
person to take such other action as may be necessary, or both.
2 7
In addition to authorizing judicial suit, section 7003 permits EPA to
issue administrative orders "as may be necessary to protect public
health and the environment."28
23. "Hazardous waste" as defined by RCRA is a subset of the statutory definition of
"solid waste." Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (definition of"hazardous waste) with
§ 6903(27) (definition of "solid waste"). Subtitle D of RCRA covers non-hazardous
solid waste, though much of the regulation of non-hazardous solid wastes is left
to the states. Id. §§ 6951-6956.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 211-14 (3d Cir. 1982).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (2000).
26. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 94-580, § 7003, 90 Stat.
2795, 2862 (1976); Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
482, § 25, 94 Stat. 2334, 2348 (1980); Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 402, 98 Stat. 3221, 3271 (1984).
27. 42 U.S.C § 6973(a).
28. Id. Failure to comply with such an order can lead to fines of up to $5000 per day.
Id. § 6973(b).
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1. Elements
Patterned after other "imminent and substantial endangerment"
provisions in other federal statutes,29 section 7003 is a powerful tool
by which liable parties can be forced to abate the endangerment, inter
alia, by cleaning up the waste. Courts have identified three funda-
mental elements for a government action under section 7003: (1) con-
ditions may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to
health or the environment; (2) the endangerment arises from the past
or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of
any solid or hazardous waste; and (3) the defendant has contributed or
is contributing to such handling, storage, treatment, transportation or
disposal. 30 In most cases, the government has had little trouble estab-
lishing these elements.
a. Imminent and Substantial Endangerment
The phrase "imminent and substantial endangerment" arguably
was intended to make sure that the EPA did not use its powers under
section 7003 routinely.31 However, focusing on the preceding words
"may present"-and the fact that Congress in 1980 substituted "may
present" for the words "is presenting" in the 1976 original32-courts
have interpreted the "imminent and substantial endangerment" ele-
ment of a section 7003 claim expansively. Neither certainty nor proof
of actual harm has been required; merely a showing of a risk of harm
seems to suffice. 3 3 There need not be an emergency in order for there
to be an "imminent" endangerment. Rather, it has been found that
even though the harm may not be realized for years in the future, an
endangerment is "imminent" if the current conditions indicate that
29. Clean Air Act § 303, 42 U.S.C. § 7603 (2000); Clean Water Act § 504(a), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1364(a) (2000). CERCLA section 106, enacted in 1980, is similar. 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606 (2000).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Bliss, 667 F. Supp. 1298, 1313 (E.D. Mo. 1987); OFFICE
OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, Gui-
DANCE ON THE USE OF SECTION 7003 OF RCRA, at 9 (Oct. 1997).
31. For example, a 1976 Senate report notes that section 7003 was envisioned as a
means of providing "emergency authority." S. REP. No. 94-988, at 16 (1976). See
Me. People's Alliance v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 286-95 (1st Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 93 (2007) (noting merit in some arguments made by defen-
dant that "imminent and substantial endangerment" should connote a higher
standard of risk or harm, but ultimately rejects the arguments).
32. Pub. L. No. 96-482, § 25, 94 Stat. 2334, 2348 (1980); H.R. REP. No. 96-1444, at 44
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019, 5043.
33. United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
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there may be a future risk of harm. 34 The level of potential harm, like
the degree of risk, need not be quantified.
35
b. Handling, Storage, Treatment, Transportation or Disposal
of Solid or Hazardous Waste
RCRA has both statutory and regulatory definitions of "hazardous
waste" and "solid waste."3 6 The focus of Subtitle C of RCRA is on
"hazardous waste," as defined in the regulations, which is a subset of
the regulatory definition of "solid waste."3 7 As a result, most of the
RCRA program's complex and detailed requirements for those who
generate, transport, treat, store or dispose of "hazardous waste" de-
pend upon there being a "listed" or "characteristic" hazardous waste
within the meaning of the RCRA regulations.38
But the scope of section 7003 goes far beyond "hazardous waste"
and "solid waste" as defined under the regulations. For purposes of
section 7003, all materials that meet the broad statutory definition of
"solid waste" are included.39 "Solid waste" as defined by the statute
includes virtually all "discarded" materials of any type-including
semi-solids, liquids and containerized gases.40 Wastes which meet the
statutory definition of "hazardous waste" are included within the stat-
utory definition of "solid waste."
4 1
34. Waste Indus., 734 F.2d at 165; Conservation Chem., 619 F. Supp. at 194-95.
35. Conservation Chem., 619 F. Supp. at 194-95; Dague v. City of Burlington, 935
F.2d 1343, 1355-56 (2d Cir. 1991), rev'd in part on other grounds, 505 U.S. 557
(1992).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5), (27) (2000) (defining hazardous and solid waste); 40 C.F.R.
§§ 261.2, 261.3, 261.20-33 (2006) (defining hazardous and solid waste).
37. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.2, 261.3, 261.20, 261.30 (2000) (defining solid and hazardous
wastes). Section 3001, 42 U.S.C. 6921, authorizes the EPA to issue regulations
identifying "listed" and "characteristic" hazardous wastes subject to the provi-
sions of subtitle C, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939 (2000), which govern hazardous waste
management.
38. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6925; 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.20-.24, 261.30-33 (2006) (defining
characteristic and listed).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6903(27), 6973(a) (2000). See generally Adam Babich, RCRA Immi-
nent Hazard Authority: A Powerful Tool for Businesses, Governments, and Citizen
Enforcers, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10122, 10124-10127 (1994).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27).
41. Id. § 6903(5), (27) (defining hazardous and solid waste respectively). Of course,
wastes that meet the regulatory definitions of "solid waste" and "hazardous
waste" are also subject to section 7003. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.1(b)(2) (2007) (Section
7003 covers more than "solid" and "hazardous" wastes as defined under the regu-
lations). Wastes that have been exempted from regulation under subtitle C of
RCRA nevertheless may be subject to required remediation under section 7003,
because they are within the statutory definition of "solid waste." Examples in-
clude Bevill wastes, such as fly ash and mining wastes. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(3)(A).
"Solid waste" under RCRA § 7003 can be even broader than "hazardous sub-
stances" under CERCLA, particularly due to CERCLA's petroleum exclusion. See
Id. § 9601(14) (definition of "hazardous substance").
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The terms "storage," "treatment," "transportation" and "disposal"
all have fairly broad definitions under RCRA,42 but section 7003 also
uses the undefined term "handling," which has been interpreted even
more broadly to include anyone who deals with or has responsibility
for waste. 43 Thus, any "handling" of any "solid waste"-that is, virtu-
ally any involvement with virtually any discarded material-can sat-
isfy this element of liability under RCRA section 7003.
c. Contributed or Contributing to
Prior to 1984, there was a split of authority as to whether section
7003 covered past acts and inactive sites.4" Even the EPA was of two
minds on the subject: in 1978 it interpreted section 7003 as not being
applicable to inactive sites, but in 1980 the agency reversed field and
interpreted section 7003 as authorizing cleanups at inactive sites.4 5
But Congress' 1984 amendments added language which clarified that
the government could use section 7003 to require abatement of cur-
rent conditions that arose from past acts.4 6 It is now clear that RCRA
section 7003 can be used to require cleanups at any site where there
may be an imminent and substantial endangerment, irrespective of
whether operations at the site are still active.47
Congress has expressed its intent that the phrase "contributing to"
should be liberally construed.48 Section 7003 is a strict liability provi-
sion, imposing liability upon persons regardless of fault or negli-
gence. 49 Although "contributing to" necessitates some degree of
42. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3), (33), (34) (2000) (definitions of disposal, storage, and treat-
ment); 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (2007) (transportation).
43. See Lincoln Prop., Ltd., v. Higgins, CIV. No. S-91-760DFL/GGH, 1993 WL
217429, at *15 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
44. Compare United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984) (liabil-
ity for inactive site) with United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(no liability for pre-1976 disposal).
45. Compare Hazardous Waste Guidelines and Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,946,
58,984 (Dec. 18, 1978) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 250) with Standards for
Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal
Facilities, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,155, 33,170 (May 19, 1980).
46. H.R. REP. No. 98-198, at 47 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5606.
Originally, section 7003 contemplated liability for any person who "is contribut-
ing" to the endangerment. The 1984 amendment revised the section to make lia-
ble any person who "has contributed or who is contributing" to the
endangerment. Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 402, 98 Stat. 3221, 3271 (1984).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 217-18
(W.D. Mo. 1985).
48. S. REP. No. 96-172, at 5 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019, 5023 (dis-
cussing 1980 amendment to section 7003). See United States v. Aceto Agric.
Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1383 (8th Cir. 1989) (construing RCRA liability even
broader than "arranger" liability under CERCLA).
49. United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985); Conserva-
tion Chem., 619 F. Supp. at 198.
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causation, the level of causation required to establish liability under
section 7003 generally has been fairly low. For example, a landowner
who failed to abate an existing hazardous condition of which he was
aware was held to have "contributed to" the endangering condition.50
"Any person" who has contributed to or is contributing to the pres-
ence of waste which may present an imminent and substantial endan-
germent is subject to liability under section 7003.51 Such persons
expressly may include past or present generators and transporters of
waste, and past or present owners or operators of treatment, storage
or disposal facilities. 5 2
2. Relief
Relief the government may obtain under section 7003 expressly in-
cludes the power "to restrain" and to order "such other action as may
be necessary."53 Accordingly, the government has obtained a wide
range of injunctive relief under section 7003. This relief includes not
only prohibitory injunctions but also mandatory injunctions requiring
a liable person to abate the endangering conditions by investigating
and remediating property contaminated with solid or hazardous
wastes. 54
The power and breadth of relief afforded by section 7003 was un-
derscored by the Third Circuit in United States v. Price. 55 The United
States sought an injunction requiring the current and former owners
and operators of a New Jersey landfill to fund a governmental study of
groundwater contamination around the landfill. Although it affirmed
the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction, the Third Cir-
cuit made clear that section 7003 afforded courts expansive powers to
grant equitable relief where a contaminated site poses a risk of harm
to health or the environment. 56 The Third Circuit specifically rejected
arguments that the court's equitable powers under section 7003 could
not afford relief that would cause a defendant to spend money, fund an
50. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982). However, current owners
who acquired contaminated properties after the contaminating activities ceased
have been held not liable, at least where the owners were not aware of the con-
tamination at the time of acquisition. Marriott Corp. v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 929
F. Supp. 396 (S.D. Fla. 1996); First San Diego Prop. v. Exxon Co., 859 F. Supp.
1313 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (2000).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980).
55. 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
56. "Congress sought to invoke the broad and flexible equity powers of the federal
courts in instances where hazardous wastes threatened human health." Id. at
211 (citing S. REP. No. 96-172, at 5 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019,
5023).
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investigation, or reimburse the government for cleanup work already
undertaken.5 7
Subsequently, the Senate report on the 1984 amendments to
RCRA cited Price with approval and quoted liberally from the Third
Circuit's opinion. The report noted that section 7003 is "intended to
confer upon the courts the authority to grant affirmative equitable re-
lief to the extent necessary to eliminate risks posed by toxic waste."5 8
As a result, some courts have invoked their equity powers to require
responsible parties to fund the United States' future cleanup work, 59
and to grant the United States restitution of past costs the govern-
ment incurred to clean up endangering conditions posed by wastes,
even for costs incurred prior to the government filing suit.
60
3. Overlap with CERCLA
So the United States pursuant to section 7003 can, via suit or ad-
ministrative order, require a defendant to investigate and remediate a
site contaminated with solid waste, to pay toward the government's
future cleanup work, and perhaps even to reimburse past costs ex-
pended by the government to investigate and remediate such a site.
As such, there are considerable similarities between section 7003 and
the government's authority under CERCLA.
CERCLA was enacted in 1980, just four years after Congress
thought it had closed the "last remaining loophole" in environmental
law by passing RCRA.61 Prompted by Love Canal, where chemicals
57. Id. at 213-14.
58. S. REP. No. 98-284, at 59 (1984).
59. United States v. Torlaw Realty, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 2d 967 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
60. United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1383 (8th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 209 (W.D. Mo. 1985). In
Price, the United States had asked the court to order the defendant to pay for the
government's future study of the site. 688 F.2d at 210.
As discussed more fully in Part II.B.2 below, in 1996 the United States Su-
preme Court held that a plaintiff in a RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) citizen suit
cannot recover cleanup costs it incurred prior to initiating the lawsuit. Meghrig
v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996). Because the language of section
7002(a)(1)(B) on which the Court based its decision is essentially identical to the
corresponding language of section 7003(a), it is questionable whether pre-
Meghrig cases allowing the government to recover cleanup cost incurred pre-com-
plaint are still good law. In published guidance, the United States takes the posi-
tion that Meghrig should not be extended to RCRA section 7003 cases and that
the government pursuant to section 7003 can recover pre-complaint cleanup
costs. OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE AssuRANCE, supra note 30, at
23. However, at least one court has followed Meghrig and found that the United
States cannot recover cleanup costs under section 7003. United States v. Apex
Oil Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 948 (S.D. Ill. 2006).
61. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980); H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at 4 (1976), as
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6241.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:420
from an old waste dump began oozing through a residential commu-
nity near Niagara Falls, New York that had been constructed on the
site, CERCLA was enacted primarily to fund the investigation and
cleanup of sites where hazardous substances formerly had been dis-
posed.6 2 CERCLA allows the government to bring suit to recover past
and future costs of addressing releases of hazardous substances at a
site under CERCLA section 107, as well as to issue an administrative
order mandating a cleanup pursuant to CERCLA section 106 if the
site may present an imminent and substantial endangerment.63 The
statute makes four categories of parties strictly liable: (1) current
owners and operators of the facility; (2) past owners and operators at
the time hazardous substances were disposed of at the facility; (3) gen-
erators or others who arranged for the disposal of hazardous sub-
stances at the facility; and (4) transporters of hazardous substances to
the facility.64 One of CERCLA's aims was to provide for the cleanup of
contaminated sites by requiring polluters to pay rather than the
public. 6
5
There is considerable overlap between CERCLA and RCRA, and
that is certainly true with respect to section 7003 and CERCLA sec-
tions 106 and 107. At many sites the same contamination may consti-
tute both releases of "hazardous substances" under CERCLA and
"solid wastes" presenting an imminent and substantial endangerment
under RCRA, thus giving rise to claims under either CERCLA or
RCRA section 7003. Congress and the courts have made clear that
RCRA section 7003 can apply to inactive sites as well as ongoing oper-
ations, 66 and likewise CERCLA has been applied to active as well as
62. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND
POLICY 366 (5th ed. 2006). At least part of the impetus for CERCLA was EPA's
reluctance prior to 1980 to use its RCRA § 7003 authority at inactive sites. See
Hazardous Waste Guidelines and Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,946, 58,984 (Dec.
18, 1978) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 250) (interpreting section 7003 as not
applying to inactive disposal sites). The EPA subsequently reversed its interpre-
tation. Standards for Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment,
Storage, and Disposal Facilities, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,155, 33,170 (May 19, 1980). And
Congress in 1984 amended section 7003 to include past tense as well as present
tense language. H.R. REP. No. 98-198, at 47 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5606.
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(a), 9607(a) (2000). Under CERCLA section 106, the United
States can seek injunctive relief judicially as well, id. § 9606(a), but seldom does.
64. Id. § 9607(a). See, e.g., United States v. A & N Cleaners & Launderers, Inc., 788
F. Supp. 1317 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (liability under CERCLA is strict).
65. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805-06 (S.D. Oh. 1983);
JOHN M. HysoN, PRIVATE COST RECOVERY ACTIONS UNDER CERCLA 15 (2003).
66. See United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 198 (W.D. Mo. 1985); H.R.
REP. No. 98-198, at 47 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5606.
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abandoned sites.6 7 Indeed, the United States sometimes takes actions
against a defendant pursuant to RCRA section 7003 and CERCLA at
the same site simultaneously.6 S Courts have recognized that the leg-
islative purposes, core liability issues and responsible parties under
RCRA section 7003 and CERCLA are similar.69
Acknowledging the overlap, the EPA has issued a guidance docu-
ment for its regions to help decide when to use CERCLA and when to
use section 7003.70 For example, CERCLA imposes harsher penalties
for violations of orders and contains an express bar against pre-en-
forcement review.71 The guidance emphasizes that the regions should
consider using section 7003 instead of CERCLA where the pollutants
are statutory "solid wastes" under RCRA but are outside of CERCLA's
definition of "hazardous substances."72 The most important example
of such a pollutant is petroleum, which is excluded from "hazardous
substances" under CERCLA, but which if spilled or otherwise dis-
carded is a "solid waste" under RCRA.73 As a result, many RCRA im-
minent hazard cases involve petroleum contamination. 7 4
B. Section 7002(a)(1)(B) Citizen Suits
Many environmental statutes contain citizen suit provisions that
allow suits by "private attorney generals," either against persons who
have violated the requirements of the law, or against the EPA for fail-
ure to discharge a non-discretionary duty thereunder.75 When enacted
in 1976, section 7002 of RCRA provided for such citizen suits against
persons alleged to be in violation of any permit, regulation or other
requirement of RCRA, and against the Administrator of the EPA
67. See, e.g., Beazer E., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 34 F.3d 206 (3d Cir. 1994) (CERCLA cost
recovery action at active coke manufacturing plant).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1111 (D.
Minn. 1982).
69. See Consol. Cos. v. Union Pac. R.R., 499 F.3d 382, 387 (5th Cir. 2007) (legislative
purposes); Foster v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 199, 204-06 (D.D.C. 1996) (core
liability issues and responsible parties).
70. OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, supra note 30.
71. Under CERCLA section 106, the EPA may seeks penalties of up to $25,000 per
day for failure to comply with an order issued under section 106, with the pros-
pect of treble damages, compared to $5000 per day under RCRA § 7003(b). Com-
pare 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(b), 9607(c)(3) (2000) with 42 U.S.C. § 6973(b) (2000).
72. OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, supra note 30, at 8.
73. See Zands v. Nelson, 779 F. Supp. 1254, 1262 (S.D. Cal. 1991). Compare 42
U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2000) (CERCLA definition of"hazardous substance," which ex-
pressly does not include "petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof")
with 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (27) (RCRA definition of "solid waste").
74. Examples include Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996), Furrer v. Brown,
62 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 1992), and United States v. Valentine, 856F. Supp. 627 (D.
Wyo. 1994).
75. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365 (2000).
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where there is an alleged failure to perform an act or duty under
RCRA which is not discretionary.76 These traditional citizen suit pro-
visions are now codified at sections 7002(a)(1)(A) and 7002(a)(2),
respectively.77
In 1984, though, Congress added a third, unique type of citizen suit
to RCRA.78 Patterned after section 7003, section 7002(a)(1)(B) autho-
rizes "any person" to sue anyone who has contributed or is contribut-
ing to the presence of solid or hazardous waste which may present an
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment:
(a) In general
Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section, any person may
commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1)(A) ....
(B) against any person, including the United States and any other govern-
mental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted by the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution, and including any past or present generator,
past or present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treat-
ment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or who is contributing
to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal
of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substan-
tial endangerment to health or the environment .... 79
Consistent with section 7003, section 7002(a) provides a court with
jurisdiction "to restrain any person who has contributed or is contrib-
uting to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transporta-
tion, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in
paragraph (1)(B), to order such person to take such other action as
may be necessary, or both ...."80
Section 7002(b) establishes certain pre-conditions for bringing a
citizen suit under section 7002(a)(1)(B).s 1 At least 90 days prior to
commencing suit, a citizen suit plaintiff must give notice of the endan-
germent to the EPA Administrator, the state in which the endanger-
ment occurs, and the putative defendants.8 2 Section 7002(b) also sets
forth a number of limitations intended to assure that such citizen
suits do not disrupt ongoing federal or state actions under RCRA or
CERCLA. For example, no citizen suit may be commenced pursuant
to section 7002(a)(1)(B) where the United States is already addressing
the endangerment by diligently prosecuting an action under RCRA
76. Pub. L. No. 94-580, § 7002(a), 90 Stat. 2795, 2825 (1976).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A), (a)(2) (2000).
78. Pub. L. No. 98-616, §11(f), 98 Stat. 3221 (1984).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2000).
80. Id. § 6972(a).
81. Id. § 6972(b)(2).
82. Id. § 6972(b)(2)(A). Additionally, the plaintiff must serve copies of the complaint
upon the Attorney General of the United States and the Administrator of the
EPA. Id. § 6972(b)(2)(F).
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section 7003 or CERCLA section 106, is engaged in a CERCLA re-
moval or remedial action, or has issued an order under CERCLA sec-
tion 106 or RCRA section 7003 requiring a liable party to conduct a
removal or remedial action.8 3 Similarly, a section 7002(a)(1)(B) citi-
zen suit is barred where a state is diligently prosecuting its own citi-
zen suit under section 7002(a)(1)(B) or is engaged in a removal or
remedial action under CERCLA with respect to the endangerment.
8 4
The apparent impetus for the 1984 addition of this unique immi-
nent hazard citizen suit power was Congressional concern that the
EPA during the early 1980s lacked the resources and will to bring ac-
tions itself pursuant to section 7003. Hence, Congress conferred the
right upon private citizens to sue to abate imminent and substantial
endangerments "pursuant to the standards of liability established
under section 7003," where the EPA failed to act.
8 5
1. Elements
Courts generally have heeded Congress' instruction and inter-
preted section 7002(a)(1)(B) co-extensively with section 7003. The
three main elements for an imminent hazard claim under section 7003
are the same core elements necessary to maintain a citizen suit under
section 7002(a)(1)(B): (1) conditions at the site may present an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment; (2) the endangerment stems from
the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation or
disposal of any hazardous or solid waste; and (3) the defendant has
contributed or is contributing to such handling, storage, treatment,
transportation or disposal.8 6 Courts have liberally construed these el-
ements in citizen suits as well, frequently citing cases decided under
section 7003 and legislative history pertaining to section 7003 as
authority.8
7
By its terms, section 7002(a) allows "any person" to commence a
citizen suit, including an imminent hazard action under section
7002(a)(1)(B).8 8 Accordingly, even if the plaintiff contributed to the
endangerment and itself would be a responsible party under RCRA
sections 7003 or 7002(a)(1)(B), courts consistently have allowed such a
83. Id. § 6972(b)(2)(B). This further illustrates that RCRA's imminent hazard provi-
sions and CERCLA are overlapping and similar.
84. Id. § 6972(b)(2)(C).
85. H.R. REP. No. 98-198, at 53 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.A.N.N. 5576, 5612.
86. See, e.g., PMC Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998).
87. See, e.g., Me. Peoples Alliance v. Mallinkrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277 (1st Cir. 2006)
(interpreting "imminent and substantial endangerment"), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
93 (2007); Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 293 (5th Cir. 2001); Zands v. Nel-
son, 797 F. Supp. 805 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (interpreting "contributed to").
88. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2000).
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non-innocent plaintiff to maintain a citizen suit under section
7002(a)(1)(B) against another responsible party.8 9
As with all citizen suit provisions, a plaintiff suing under RCRA
section 7002(a)(1)(B) must establish constitutional standing by dem-
onstrating injury in fact, causation and redressability.90 While plain-
tiffs typically have little trouble satisfying these Article III
requirements, occasionally an individual or organization will be
barred from maintaining a section 7002(a)(1)(B) claim due to lack of
standing.9 1
2. Relief
Section 7002(a), like section 7003, expressly authorizes a court "to
restrain" persons who have contributed to or are contributing to the
presence of waste which may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment, and to order such per-
sons "to take such other action as may be necessary."92 As in section
7003 cases, courts can and do grant mandatory injunctions under sec-
tion 7002(a)(1)(B) to remediate wastes which may present an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment. 93
One area where courts construing section 7002(a)(1)(B) have di-
verged from precedent under section 7003, however, is with respect to
restitution. As mentioned above, some courts pursuant to section
7003 have allowed the United States to recover its past costs incurred
to clean up a site contaminated with solid or hazardous wastes.9 4 By
contrast, the United States Supreme Court in Meghrig v. KFC West-
ern, Inc.95 held that section 7002(a)(1)(B) does not authorize a citizen
suit plaintiff to recover cleanup costs incurred prior to initiating suit.
89. See, e.g., PMC, 151 F.3d 610 (current owner who contributed to contamination);
Organic Chems. Site PRP Group v. Total Petroleum. Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 660 (W.D.
Mich. 1998); Bayless Inv. & Trading Co. v. Chevron USA, No. 93C704, 1994 WL
1841850, at *10-11 (D. Ariz. May 25, 1994) (owner of leaking tanks). See also
Sealy Conn., Inc. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 120 (D. Conn. 1997) (expres-
sing in footnote concern about allowing current owner to maintain a section
7002(a)(1)(B) citizen suit).
90. See, e.g., Consol. Cos. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 499 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2007); Me.
People's Alliance, 471 F.3d 277; 1100 W. LLC v. Red Spot Paint & Varnish Co.,
No. 1:05-cv-1670-LJM-WTL, 2007 WL 3036876 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 15, 2007).
91. For example, a plaintiff was found to lack injury in fact where he failed to show a
present connection-economic, aesthetic or recreational-to the area allegedly
posing the endangerment. Pape v. Lake States Wood Pres., Inc., 948 F. Supp.
697 (W.D. Mich. 1995). See also Citizens for a Better Env't v. Caterpillar, Inc., 30
F. Supp. 2d 1053 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that plaintiff failed to establish causa-
tion and redressability).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
93. See City of Bangor v. Citizens Commc'ns Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 180, 218 (D. Me.
2006); Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 484 (1996).
94. See supra note 60.
95. 516 U.S. 479 (1996).
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Plaintiff KFC Western discovered that its property was contami-
nated with petroleum and spent $211,000 removing and disposing of
oil-contaminated soils. Three years later, plaintiff initiated a citizen
suit under section 7002(a)(1)(B) against Meghrig, a prior owner of the
site who allegedly had contributed to the contamination, seeking reim-
bursement of its cleanup costs. Reversing a Ninth Circuit ruling up-
holding KFC Western's complaint,9 6 the U.S. Supreme Court in
Meghrig pointed to two aspects of section 7002(a)(1)(B) to support its
holding that a private plaintiff cannot use section 7002(a)(1)(B) to re-
cover cleanup costs incurred prior to commencing suit. First, only
where conditions "may present an imminent and substantial endan-
germent" will a citizen suit lie-if the site already is cleaned up, the
Court reasoned, it no longer could present an imminent danger.
9 7
Second, a plaintiff under section 7002(a)(1)(B) can seek a mandatory
injunction for a defendant to "take action," or a prohibitory injunction
to "restrain" a defendant, but according to the Court section
7002(a)(1)(B) does not authorize equitable restitution for past costs.
98
In so holding, the Court compared section 7002(a)(1)(B) with CER-
CLA, which expressly provides for cost recovery and contribution by
private parties under sections 107(a) and 113(f)(1). "Congress thus
demonstrated in CERCLA that it knew how to provide for the recovery
of cleanup costs, and that the language used to define remedies under
RCRA does not provide that remedy."9 9 Rejecting arguments by
plaintiff, and the United States as amicus curiae, that a private party
could seek equitable restitution for pre-complaint cleanup costs where
the site continued to pose an imminent endangerment at the time the
suit was initiated, the Court emphasized that where Congress has
provided "elaborate enforcement provisions" for remedying violation of
a federal statute, "as Congress has done with RCRA and CERCLA," it
cannot be assumed that Congress intended to authorize additional im-
plied judicial remedies for private citizens.10 0 "[Ilt is an elemental ca-
non of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides
96. KFC W., Inc. v. Meghrig, 49 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 516 U.S. 479 (1996).
97. Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 485-86.
98. Id. at 484.
99. Id. at 485.
100. Id. at 487-88. As discussed infra, although RCRA section 3008 has relatively
elaborate enforcement provisions, including compliance orders, civil penalties
and criminal sanctions of up to fifteen years imprisonment, section 3008 is inap-
plicable to RCRA's imminent hazard provisions. 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (2000); United
States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 1984). RCRA sections
7002(a) and 7003(a), by contrast, outline broad equitable powers "to restrain[,]
... to take such other action as may be necessary, or both .... " 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6972(a), 6973(a) (2000).
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a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading
others into it."1O1
The Meghrig Court left open whether a citizen suit plaintiff could
recover costs incurred post-complaint where the site continued to pose
an imminent and substantial endangerment at the time suit was initi-
ated.1O2 Although some courts and commentators have concluded
that such post-complaint costs should be recoverable under section
7002(a)(1)(B),' 0 3 subsequent decisions by some other courts have
ruled that the language and rationale of Meghrig serve to deny resti-
tution for such post-complaint costs as well.1o4 As the Seventh Circuit
explained in denying recovery of costs incurred by a private plaintiff
after initiating a section 7002(a)(1)(B) citizen suit, the Meghrig opin-
ion "emphasizes that in interpreting RCRA we need to take Congress
at its word and that we must be 'chary of reading' additional remedies
into a statute that, like RCRA, expressly provides for a particular
remedy."1o 5
101. Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 488 (quoting Transamerica Mortgages Advisors, Inc., v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979)). The Meghrig Court also made three other points.
First, there is no statute of limitations in RCRA, whereas CERCLA section
113(g)(2) contains limitation periods governing suits for cost recovery. Second,
RCRA does not expressly require that costs being sought are reasonable, whereas
CERCLA section 107(a)(4) expressly provides that costs recovered by private par-
ties must be "consistent with the national contingency plan." Third, the Court
reasoned that if RCRA were designed to compensate private parties for past
cleanup costs, the RCRA provisions barring citizen suits unless there has been
ninety days notice and the government is not already taking action would be
"wholly irrational," because they would allow only private parties at sites with
waste problems that were insufficiently severe to attract the attention of govern-
ment officials to recover past costs, while private parties at sites with substantial
problems would be foreclosed from recovering pasts costs. Id. at 486-87.
102. Id. at 488.
103. See Gilroy Canning Co. v. Cal. Canners & Growers, 15 F. Supp. 2d 943, 945 (N.D.
Cal. 1998) (authorizing relief that would require defendant to pay for future
cleanup costs); Dennis B. Danella, Note, Avondale Federal Savings Bank v.
Amoco Oil Co.: No Equity in Sight for RCRA Victims, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 663
(2000); Randall James Butterfield, Note, Recovering Environmental Cleanup
Costs Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act: A Potential Solution to
a Persistent Problem, 49 VAD. L. REV. 689 (1996).
104. Avondale Fed. Sav. Bank v. Amoco Oil Co., 170 F.3d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 1999);
Andritz Sprout-Bauer, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 609 (M.D. Pa. 1997).
105. Avondale, 170 F.3d at 694. In Avondale the Seventh Circuit stated that "Con-
gress deliberately limited RCRA's remedies to injunctive relief-more specifi-
cally, injunctive relief obtained before the property is cleaned up, while danger to
health or the environment is 'imminent and substantial.' Neither Meghrig nor
RCRA can be read to allow a party to recover cleanup costs." Id. The dissent,
though, noted that the Meghrig opinion left open the issue of recovery of post-
complaint costs, that the plaintiff in Avondale could have obtained an injunction
at the time it initiated suit and should not be penalized for undertaking the
cleanup while suit was pending, and that the language of section 7002(a) al-
lowing the court to "order such person to take such other action as may be neces-
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Because the terms of sections 7002(a) and 7003 are virtually iden-
tical with respect to the types of relief available,1 0 6 it is questionable
whether post-Meghrig the United States, pursuant to section 7003,
can obtain reimbursement for past cleanup costs incurred. The EPA
in published guidance takes the position that Meghrig's bar on recov-
ery of pre-complaint costs under section 7002(a)(1)(B) should not be
extended to section 7003 actions.1 0 7 However, at least one court has
relied on Meghrig to rule that the United States cannot recover
cleanup costs under section 7003.108
Despite the unavailability of cost recovery for private plaintiffs, the
prospect for injunctive relief and attorney fees makes section
7002(a)(1)(B) a powerful and popular tool for parties seeking to clean
up contaminated property. Section 7002(e), applicable to all RCRA
citizen suits, provides that a court "may award costs of litigation (in-
cluding reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to the prevailing
or substantially prevailing party."109
Illustrative of the power of a RCRA citizen suit under section
7002(a)(1)(B) to force remediation of a contaminated site is Interfaith
Community Organization v. Honeywell International, Inc.1 10 Wastes
from former operations by Honeywell's corporate predecessor were
contributing to contamination of the adjacent Hackensack River in
New Jersey, and a citizen group filed suit under RCRA section
7002(a)(1)(B) against Honeywell. In a decision affirmed by the Third
Circuit, the federal district court found that the waste at the site con-
stituted an imminent and substantial endangerment and issued an
injunction that required Honeywell to excavate and remove about 1.5
million tons of chromium-contaminated soil and waste, at an esti-
mated cost of more than $400 million; to remediate contaminated sedi-
ments in the river; and to further investigate groundwater
sary" should permit the court to award equitable restitution. Id. at 697 (Wood, J.,
dissenting in part and concurring in part).
106. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2000) with 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (2000).
107. OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, supra note 30, at 22-23.
108. United States v. Apex Oil Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 948 (S.D. Il. 2006). In Apex, the
court held that the government's section 7003 action against a refinery owner
was not a claim dischargeable in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(5) (West
2000 & Supp. 2008), because section 7003 does not authorize recovery of mone-
tary relief. The court relied on Meghrig, emphasizing that sections 7002(a)(1)(B)
and 7003 are "nearly identical" and that the wording of the language authorizing
relief is "the same." 438 F. Supp. 2d at 953. It should be noted that in Apex it
was the United States which was arguing that the claim should not be discharged
because it was seeking solely injunctive relief to force the defendant to clean up
contamination at the refinery; it was the defendant which was contending that
section 7003 gave the United States the right to recover cleanup costs in lieu of
injunctive relief.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (2000).
110. 263 F. Supp. 2d 796 (D.N.J. 2003), affd, 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
545 U.S. 1129 (2005).
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contamination."' In a separate opinion, the district court assessed
approximately $12 million in attorney fees and litigation costs against
Honeywell.112
3. Overlap with CERCLA
As with government suits under CERCLA and RCRA section 7003,
there is a great deal of overlap between private actions under CER-
CLA section 107 and RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B). The elements of a
private CERCLA section 107 action for response costs are virtually
identical to the elements of a governmental CERCLA claim.113
Hence, just as the same site may allow the United States to sue under
CERCLA and RCRA section 7003, private parties sometimes can
bring both CERCLA section 107 and RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B)
claims at the same contaminated site versus the same defendants. 114
A private plaintiff under CERCLA. section 107 can recover past
costs incurred to investigate and clean up contamination, unlike
under RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B).11 5 In several ways, though, RCRA
citizen suits can be even more attractive for plaintiffs than CERCLA
actions. A plaintiff in a RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) citizen suit can
recover its litigation expenses, including attorney and expert fees. By
contrast, litigation expenses such as attorney fees are not recoverable
by private plaintiffs in CERCLA actions.116 Under CERCLA section
107, the plaintiff must expend some response costs before bringing a
cost recovery action, and the relief available is limited to recovery of
past costs and a declaratory judgment requiring a defendant to reim-
burse future response costs that the plaintiff incurs. That is, under
CERCLA a private plaintiff must conduct the cleanup itself and ob-
tain reimbursement from the defendant.1 17  RCRA section
111. Id. Indeed, the Third Circuit stated that the lower court had erred by using a
standard that was more stringent than required in determining whether there is
an imminent and substantial endangerment. Interfaith Cmty., 399 F.3d at 259.
112. Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 370 (D.N.J. 2004),
affd in part, vacated in part, 426 F.3d 694 (3d Cir. 2005).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000). One exception is that a private plaintiff under CER-
CLA section 107 must show that its costs were "necessary" and "consistent with
the national contingency plan," whereas in a governmental cost recovery action
under CERCLA section 107, the defendant has the burden of showing that the
response costs were incurred "inconsistent with the national contingency plan."
Id.
114. See, e.g., City of Bangor v. Citizens Commc'ns Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 180 (D. Me.
2006); Nashua Corp. v. Norton Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 330 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
115. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007).
116. Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809 (1994).
117. "[A]n action may be commenced under section 107 for recovery of costs at any
time after such costs have been incurred." 42 U.S.C.§ 9613(g)(2) (2000). CERCLA
section 113(g)(2) also expressly authorizes a "declaratory judgment on liability for
response costs." Id.; see In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 951 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1991)
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7002(a)(1)(B) allows a private plaintiff to obtain an injunction forcing
the defendant to undertake the cleanup; plaintiff need not expend any
out-of pocket cleanup costs.
1 18
RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) is particularly important and useful
where a CERCLA claim is unavailable to the plaintiff. As mentioned
above, RCRA citizen suits are frequently initiated at sites contami-
nated by petroleum, including oil, gasoline and diesel fuel, because pe-
troleum is expressly excluded from the scope of "hazardous
substances" under CERCLA.119 Also, RCRA citizen suits became
more popular in the wake of Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services,
Inc. 120 As a result of that watershed 2004 Supreme Court decision,
responsible parties under CERCLA could no longer sue under CER-
CLA section 113(f) unless they had been sued under CERCLA sections
106 or 107 or they had settled under CERCLA with the government in
an administrative or judicially approved settlement. 121 Under pre-
Aviall precedents in many circuits, responsible parties could not main-
tain an action under CERCLA section 107.122 Such courts had held
that only innocent private plaintiffs could maintain an action under
CERCLA section 107; responsible parties could only sue under section
113(f). Post-Aviall this combination potentially left some responsible
parties without a CERCLA remedy and led some commentators to ad-
vocate the use of RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) for such responsible par-
ties facing cleanups.123 The Supreme Court's recent decision in
(holding that plaintiffs claim for declaratory judgment as to defendant's liability
will not be entertained unless plaintiff already has incurred some response costs).
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2000). Another advantage of a RCRA imminent hazard
citizen suit is that plaintiff need not comply with the National Contingency Plan,
a set of regulations promulgated by EPA governing investigations and cleanups
by governmental and private parties under CERCLA. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 300
(2007). Consistency with the National Contingency Plan is a requisite element of
a private CERCLA cost recovery action that often trips up plaintiffs seeking re-
covery of costs incurred under CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000); Sher-
win-Williams Co. v. City of Hamtramck, 840 F. Supp. 470 (E.D. Mich. 1993). See
generally Reed Neuman, You Mean They Can Sue?, 12 Bus. L. TODAY 43 (2002),
in which the author describes, and laments, the power and advantages of RCRA
imminent hazard citizen suits.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2000).
120. 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
121. Id. at 165-67; 42 U.S.C. § 9613(fl(1), (3) (2000).
122. See, e.g., Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R., Co. 142
F.3d 769 (4th Cir. 1998); Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 1998);
New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir. 1997); Pinal
Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Colo. & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995); United Techs. Corp.
v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994).
123. See, e.g., Nicholas J. Wallwork, et al., A Consideration of The RCRA Citizen Suit
Option as a Tool for Business to Shift Environmental Remediation Liability to
More Culpable Entities, 21 Toxics L. REP. 37 (2006); Carter E. Strang, The Re-
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Atlantic Research124 has re-opened the courthouse door for many re-
sponsible parties to sue under CERCLA section 107, but it remains
unclear exactly how widely the door has swung open.1
25
Contaminated properties, of course, can give rise to potential state
common law claims such as nuisance, trespass or negligence. In many
instances, however, state law is inadequate to address the problem.
Common law claims often falter due to causation hurdles, statutes of
limitations, the reasonableness or benefits of defendants' conduct, and
restrictions on who can assert the claim, the measure of damages and
the availability of injunctive relief.12 6 The equitable powers and
strict, retroactive liability scheme of RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) offer
a claim and remedy at contaminated sites where neither may be via-
ble at common law.
III. MULTIPLE RESPONSIBLE PARTIES
A wide swath of persons may be liable under RCRA sections 7003
or 7002(a)(1)(B). Any person who has contributed or is contributing to
the presence of solid or hazardous waste which may present an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment is subject to liability. 12 7 RCRA
expressly includes past and present generators, transporters, owners
and operators as among those who may be liable.12s Thus, it is not
uncommon for there to be multiple parties subject to liability under
RCRA's imminent hazard provisions at the same contaminated
site.129
source Conservation and Recovery Act's Citizen Suits in a Post-Cooper Era, 53
FED. LAW. 26 (July 2006).
124. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007).
125. For instance, the Atlantic Research opinion focused on allowing responsible par-
ties who voluntarily clean up to sue under CERCLA section 107 for recovery of
expenses they incur. Section 113(f), the Court said, would be available for reim-
bursement of costs paid to the government as a result of a suit under CERCLA
section 106 or section 107. 127 S. Ct. at 2337-38, n.6. The Court left unclear,
inter alia, whether a liable party who is forced to perform work or pay costs pur-
suant to a unilateral administrative order under CERCLA section 106 or some
other statute, such as RCRA section 7003, could maintain an action for cost re-
covery under CERCLA section 107 or could seek reimbursement under CERCLA
section 113(f). See Craig N. Johnston, United States v. Atlantic Research Corp.:
The Supreme Court Restores Voluntary Cleanups Under CERCLA, 22 J. ENVTL.
L. & LITIG. 313, 335-40 (2007).
126. See PERCIVAL, ET AL., supra note 62, at 75-76, 87; Ronald G. Aronovsky, Federal-
ism and CERCLA: Rethinking the Role of Federal Law in Private Cleanup Cost
Disputes, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 71-79 (2006); see also KFC W., Inc. v. Meghrig, 49
F.3d 418, 523-24 n.6 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 516 U.S. 479 (1996) (recognizing inad-
equacy of state law claims for plaintiff).
127. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(a)(1)(B), 6973(a) (2000).
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials & Serv., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646 (N.D.
Ohio 1993).
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A. Joint and Several Liability
The essence of joint and several liability is that the plaintiff may
sue and recover the full amount of relief from any one of the jointly
and severally liable parties. 13o By contrast, if a defendant's liability
is merely several, the plaintiff may only recover from that defendant
its share of the plaintiffs damages.13 ' The common law widely im-
poses joint and several liability among tortfeasors whose conduct
causes indivisible harm.1
32
The terms of the statute do not expressly address whether persons
liable under RCRA sections 7003 or 7002(a)(1)(B) are subject to joint
and several liability. Despite the absence of statutory language so
specifying, courts routinely have held that section 7003 imposes joint
and several liability upon defendants in favor of the United States.
Illustrative is United States v. Conservation Chemical Co.,133 in which
the court ruled that multiple generator and owner defendants would
be subject to joint and several liability under RCRA section 7003, as
well as under CERCLA section 107. Citing Price and legislative his-
tory instructing that the court has broad authority under section 7003
to grant equitable relief necessary to eliminate endangerments posed
by toxic wastes, the court held that Congress "has authorized the im-
position of joint and several liability to ensure complete relief."134
Moreover, citing legislative history indicating that Congress intended
section 7003 to be a codification and expansion of the common law of
public nuisance, 135 the court reasoned that "Congress must also have
intended for joint and several liability to be applied where the injury
is indivisible."13 6 Consistent with the common law, if the defendant
can demonstrate that the harm is divisible and that there is a reason-
able basis of apportionment, the defendant will be responsible only for
its own contribution to the harm.137
In citizen suits under section 7002(a)(1)(B), courts similarly have
held that a defendant's liability is joint and several. Thus, although
130. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 10 (2000).
131. Id. § 11.
132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 433A, 875 (1965, 1979).
133. 619 F. Supp. 162 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
134. Id. at 199 (citing Price, 688 F.2d 204, 213-14 (3d Cir. 1982); S. REP. No. 98-284,
at 59 (1984)).
135. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 96-172, at 5 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019,
5023).
136. Id. Accord United States v. Ottati & Goss Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985)
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A). But see United States v.
Stringfellow, No. CV-83-2501-MML, 1984 WL 3206, at *5-7 (C.D. Cal. 1984)
(holding that joint and several liability is not appropriate for mandatory injunc-
tive relief under RCRA section 7003 or CERCLA section 106 because court must
specify the steps to be taken and the party to take them).
137. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965); Conservation Chem., 619 F.
Supp. at 199.
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some of the contamination may be attributable to other contributors, a
liable defendant will be required to perform the entire remedy for the
site where the harm is indivisible.138 Joint and several liability for
defendants is not necessarily the rule, however, where the plaintiff
also is a responsible party. In at least one case, the court permitted
the plaintiff, a responsible party, to maintain an action under section
7002(a)(1)(B) but refused to hold the defendants jointly and severally
liable for contamination to which the plaintiff had contributed.
139
The CERCLA experience with respect to joint and several liability
largely parallels that of RCRA's imminent hazard provisions. Given
the broad categories of responsible persons under CERCLA section
107,140 it is quite common for multiple persons to be liable under
CERCLA at the same contaminated site.141 Although CERCLA is si-
lent with respect to whether responsible persons are subject to joint
and several liability or are merely severally liable, courts routinely
have found that CERCLA imposes joint and several liability upon re-
sponsible parties, at least to the government and innocent private
plaintiffs.142 This is so despite somewhat ambiguous legislative his-
tory. Explicit references to joint and several liability appeared in ear-
lier versions of the bill that became CERCLA, but were deleted from
the final version.
14 3
Thus, a single defendant at a CERCLA landfill site may be subject
to joint and several liability for all of the response costs incurred and
to be incurred at the site, even though numerous other responsible
parties also contributed to the contamination, unless the defendant
138. See, e.g., Me. Peoples Alliance v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 298 (1st Cir.
2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 93 (2007); Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 301
n.37 (5th Cir. 2001); Aurora Nat'l Bank v. Tri Star Mktg., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1020,
1034 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
139. Bayless Inv. & Trading Co., No. 93C704, 1994 WL 1841850, at *10-11 (D. Ariz.
May 25, 1994). But see City of Bangor v. Citizens Commc'n Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d
180, 219 (D. Me. 2006) (holding responsible party plaintiff and defendant jointly
and severally liable).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (2000).
141. See, e.g., United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
142. See United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2338-39, n.7 (assuming,
without deciding, that section 107(a) provides for joint and several liability). The
availability of joint and several liability for a plaintiff under CERCLA § 107 was
one of the reasons that led most courts, pre-Aviall, to restrict claims for responsi-
ble party plaintiffs to section 113(f), which expressly provides for allocation of
costs among liable parties. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc., 543
U.S. 157, 169 (2004) (collecting cases); 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000).
143. See 126 CONG. REC. 30932 (Nov. 24, 1980). A key Congressional sponsor ex-
plained that unresolved issues of liability, such as joint and several liability,
should be resolved by "traditional and evolving principles of common law." Id.
(statement of Sen. Randolph). For a discussion of CERCLA's legislative history
regarding joint and several liability, see United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572
F. Supp. 802, 805-08 (S.D. Ohio 1983); HysON, supra note 65, at 16.
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can establish that the harm it caused is divisible.144 The burden of
divisibility has been a heavy one, and defendants are seldom success-
ful in showing divisibility.145
B. Contribution Under Common Law and CERCLA
The harsh consequences of joint and several liability can be amelio-
rated by allowing a defendant to bring a claim for contribution against
other responsible parties. The essence of contribution is that where
multiple persons are liable to the same plaintiff for the same harm,
one liable party who discharges the common liability has a claim
against the other liable parties for the amount he has paid in excess of
his fair share of the common liability.146 Contribution has long been
recognized in courts of equity,147 but historically was not generally
available at common law. The common law rule against contribution
among joint tortfeasors had its origin in Merryweather v. Nixan, a
1799 English case in which contribution was denied to an intentional
wrongdoer. 148 Subsequent English cases prohibited contribution for
intentional wrongdoers, but they generally allowed contribution for
defendants held liable in cases of negligence and other unintentional
acts.14 9 Early American cases tended to follow the same dichot-
omy.150 However, the origin of the rule was soon lost, and for many
years United States courts widely prohibited contribution among all
tortfeasors, even in cases of mere negligence.151 During the 20th Cen-
tury, spurred by scholars who decried the injustice of a rule banning
contribution for defendants held jointly and severally liable for non-
intentional acts, the vast majority of states authorized a right of con-
144. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 433A, 875 (1965, 1979); Chem-Dyne
Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 810.
145. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2003); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965) (allowing divisibility only
where two distinct harms exist or where the contribution of each cause to a single
harm can be reasonably determined).
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1979); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp.
Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 87-88 (1981).
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A cmt. c (1979); Michael V. Hernandez,
Cost Recovery or Contribution?: Resolving the Controversy Over CERCLA Claims
Brought by Potentially Responsible Parties, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 83, 100
(1997); George Lee Flint, Jr. & Philip W. Moore, Jr., ERISA: A Co-Fiduciary Has
No Right to Contribution and Indemnity, 48 S.D. L. REV. 7, 11 (2002).
148. (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B.).
149. WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 306 (4th ed. 1971).
150. Id. Compare Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns. Ch. 131 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (no contribution for
willful misconduct) with Thweatt's Adm'r v. Jones, 328 Va. (1 Rand.) (1825) (con-
tribution for negligence).
151. PROSSER, supra note 149, § 50, at 306; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A
cmt. a (1979); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 86 n.16
(1981).
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tribution among tortfeasors, either judicially or by statute. 152 The
modern view of contribution is reflected by the Restatement (Second)
of Torts section 886A, which provides for a right of contribution when
two or more persons become liable in tort to the same person for the
same harm. The right of contribution exists only in favor of a
tortfeasor who has discharged the plaintiffs claim by paying more
than his equitable share of the common liability, and the right is lim-
ited to the amount paid by him in excess of his share. 153 Under the
Restatement, there is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor
who has intentionally caused the harm.154
CERCLA likewise has alleviated the harshness of joint and several
liability by allowing a defendant to bring suit to force other responsi-
ble parties to bear their fair shares of the costs to clean up the site.
When originally enacted in 1980, CERCLA did not expressly provide
for contribution.155 Nevertheless, courts in the early 1980s repeatedly
held that a responsible party had a right of contribution, either im-
pliedly or under federal common law.15 6 In so ruling, the courts rea-
soned that contribution goes hand-in-hand with joint and several
liability; that responsible parties are more likely to settle with the
government and undertake response actions where there is a prospect
for recouping some of their costs from other responsible parties; that
government litigation and cleanup costs are reduced; and that funda-
mental fairness is promoted.15 7 As one court put it: "No goal of CER-
CLA is promoted by requiring one defendant to bear all the costs of
injuries caused in part by others."1SS
In 1986, as part of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthoriza-
tion Act, Congress added section 113(f), specifically labeled "Contribu-
tion," to clarify and confirm the right of a person held jointly and
severally liable under CERCLA to seek contribution from other re-
sponsible parties. 1 59 Allocation of response costs among liable parties
152. PROSSER, supra note 149, § 50, at 307 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 886A cmt. a (1979); Nw. Airlines, 451 U.S. at 87-88 n.17-18.
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1979).
154. Id. § 886A(3).
155. See Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv.,
Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 161-62 (2004).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 223-29
(W.D. Mo. 1985) (implied); Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27,
31 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (implied); United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp.
1258, 1269 (D. Del. 1986) (federal common law); Colo. v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F.
Supp. 1484, 1488-91 (D. Colo. 1985) (federal common law).
157. See, e.g., New Castle, 642 F. Supp. at 1268-69; ASARCO, 608 F. Supp. at
1488-89; Conservation Chem., 619 F. Supp. at 223-29.
158. ASARCO, 608 F. Supp. at 1491.
159. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613, 1647 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at 79 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861.
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is based on "such equitable factors as the court determines are appro-
priate."160 The legislative history makes clear that Congress believed
contribution was crucial to the statute's liability scheme, because it
would promote settlements, decrease litigation and facilitate clean-
ups. Congress recognized that responsible parties would be more will-
ing to settle and perform the cleanup themselves where they were
assured that they could seek contribution against other responsible
parties.161
The importance of allocating cleanup costs among responsible par-
ties under CERCLA is highlighted by the Supreme Court having is-
sued two major opinions regarding contribution and cost allocation
claims under CERCLA during the past three terms. The Court in
Cooper Industries Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc.,162 giving effect to the
"plain meaning" of section 113(f), held that a private party could seek
contribution under section 113(f) only after being sued under sections
106 or 107 or after resolving its CERCLA liability to the government
in an administrative or judicially approved settlement.163 By ascrib-
ing such "plain meaning" to the terms of section 113(f), the Court sig-
nificantly limited the circumstances pursuant to which responsible
parties could seek contribution under section 113(f). Prior to the
Court's decision in Aviall, for many years most circuit and district
courts had held that a responsible party could seek "contribution"
under section 113(f) irrespective of any prior suit or government in-
volvement.164 Section 107 claims for cost recovery, on the other hand,
were held to be available only to plaintiffs who were not responsible
parties. 165 The Aviall decision meant that a responsible party who
160. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000).
161. 100 Stat. 1613; H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at 59, 80 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.A.N.N. 2835, 2841, 2862 (1986).
162. 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
163. Id. at 165-68; see 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1), (f)(3)(B) (2000).
164. See, e.g., Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R., Co., 142
F.3d 769 (4th Cir. 1998); Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 1998);
New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir. 1997); Pinal
Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp, 118 F.3d 1298 (9th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Colo., & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995); United Techs. Corp.
v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994).
165. Indeed, claims by responsible parties seeking recovery of costs "voluntarily" in-
curred were deemed to be "quintessential contribution claims." See Bedford Affil-
iates, 156 F.3d at 424. At common law, though, "contribution" arises when
multiple parties become liable to the same person for the same harm, in favor of
the tortfeasor which has discharged the claim by paying more than its equitable
share of the common liability. Volunteers who incur costs but are not in fact
liable have no claim for contribution. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A,
cmt. e (1979). Arguably, a responsible party-plaintiff who undertakes a cleanup
without waiting to be sued is not truly a "volunteer." For purposes of this Article,
however, the term "contribution" will be reserved for claims brought by responsi-
ble parties who have been sued or otherwise found liable to a plaintiff, as opposed
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had "voluntarily" conducted a cleanup without first being sued or for-
mally settling with the government could no longer bring suit under
section 113(f). Since pre-Aviall precedent held that such a responsible
party could not sue for cost recovery under section 107, a responsible
party who voluntarily cleaned up a site could be left shouldering the
entire cleanup cost burden, without a CERCLA remedy against other
responsible parties.166 Not surprisingly, responsible parties were no
longer inclined to voluntarily undertake CERCLA cleanups, which
meant that the government would have to bring suit or conduct the
cleanup itself, resulting in delays in site remediation and increased
government litigation and cleanup costs.
167
The Supreme Court in 2007 largely rectified this situation in
United States v. Atlantic Research Corp. 1 68 The Court held that a re-
sponsible party which voluntarily incurs response costs may bring suit
under section 107 to recover the costs it incurred or will incur. Focus-
ing on the "plain language" of CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B), the Court
ruled that "any person" may maintain an action for cost recovery
under section 107-irrespective whether the claimant is a responsible
party.' 6 9 The decision overruled the numerous lower court decisions
which had restricted section 107 cost recovery actions to the govern-
ment and innocent private plaintiffs.17o The Atlantic Research opin-
ion opened an avenue for responsible parties under CERCLA to
recover at least a portion of their response costs from other responsi-
ble parties, notwithstanding that they could not bring a claim for "con-
tribution" under the terms of section 113(f).
In short, claims by responsible parties at Superfund sites against
other responsible parties-under sections 107 or 113(f), via complaint,
cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party complaint-to allocate
cleanup costs equitably among responsible parties, have been and con-
tinue to be routine, important aspects of the CERCLA legal landscape.
By contrast, though RCRA's imminent hazard provisions and CER-
CLA share similar purposes and liability schemes, provide overlap-
ping remedies aimed at cleaning up contaminated sites, and have
to claims brought by responsible party-plaintiffs who "voluntarily" incurred
cleanup costs.
166. See, e.g., Jason Nichols, Resolving the Federal Court Conflict Over CERCLA Cost
Recovery for Potentially Liable Parties-Some Suggestions for Giving Order to
Post-Aviall Section 107 Jurisprudence and for Encouraging Voluntary Cleanups
of Environmental Site Contamination, 74 TENN. L. REV. 275 (2007) (emphasizing
potential inability of responsible party who voluntarily cleans up a site to recover
costs under CERCLA, post-Aviall).
167. See, e.g., Brief for Natural Resources Defense Council et al. as Amici Curiae in
Support of Respondent at 28-30, United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct.
2331 (2007) (No. 06-562); Nichols, supra note 166, at 281.
168. 127 S. Ct. 2331 (2007).
169. Id. at 2336.
170. Id. at 2334-35.
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been interpreted as imposing joint and several liability, courts typi-
cally have refused to recognize a cause of action by a defendant, for
contribution or otherwise, to allocate cleanup cost responsibility im-
posed by RCRA sections 7003 and 7002(a)(1)(B).
IV. CONTRIBUTION CASES UNDER RCRA
A. Early Cases Split Regarding Contribution
Perhaps the earliest reported decision in which a defendant in a
RCRA imminent hazard case sought contribution from another alleg-
edly liable party was United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. in
1983.171 The United States sought injunctive relief and cost recovery
against Westinghouse at PCB-contaminated landfills in Indiana pur-
suant to RCRA section 7003 and CERCLA section 106. Westinghouse
filed a third-party complaint against Monsanto Company, which had
produced and sold the PCB-containing fluid that Westinghouse alleg-
edly disposed at the landfills, seeking contribution for a portion of any
cleanup liability imposed upon Westinghouse as a result of the gov-
ernment's RCRA and CERCLA claims. Westinghouse argued that
RCRA section 7003 and CERCLA section 106 invested the court with
equitable powers such that a contribution claim should be implied
under those federal laws to apportion any liability at the landfills be-
tween Westinghouse and Monsanto, which it claimed had contributed
to the endangering conditions. The court, however, rejected Westing-
house's argument and dismissed the third-party complaint, citing Su-
preme Court cases that had refused to imply contribution claims
under other federal statutes. 172 Specifically, the court relied upon
Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,173 in which the Court
declined to imply contribution under the Sherman and Clayton Acts,
and Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Unions,174 in which
the Court refused to imply a contribution claim under the Equal Pay
Act or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 175
171. No. IP 83-9-C, 1983 WL 160587 (S.D. Ind. June 29, 1983).
172. Id. at *3-4. The Westinghouse decision was rendered before Congress added CER-
CLA § 113(f) in 1986, and it was one of the only decisions in the early 1980s that
did not allow a contribution claim on behalf of a defendant in a CERCIA case.
See Colo. v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1492 (D. Colo. 1985).
173. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
174. 451 U.S. 77 (1981).
175. Westinghouse, No. IP 83-9-C, 1983 WL 160587, at *4. Northwest Airlines and
Texas Industries continue to be viewed by the Supreme Court as leading cases
relating to contribution claims, implied or under federal common law, where a
federal statute does not expressly provide for contribution. See Aviall, 543 U.S.
at 162. The Court did not decide whether CERCLA section 107 or section 113(f)
gave rise to an implied contribution claim for a responsible party which volunta-
rily incurred cleanup costs, but stated that it was "debatable" in light of Texas
Industries and Northwest Airlines. Id.
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In another early government RCRA action, a federal district court
held that a defendant could not obtain contribution by asserting a
claim under section 7002(a)(1)(B). In United States v. Production
Plated Plastics Inc.,176 the court dismissed a contribution claim by a
defendant in an RCRA section 3008 enforcement action, 17 7 ruling
that the defendant could not rely upon section 7002(a)(1)(B) for an im-
plied contribution claim. As in Westinghouse, the court relied upon
Texas Industries and Northwest Airlines to hold that no contribution
claim should be implied. The court reasoned that Congress did not
intend to allow an implied right of contribution because the remedial
scope of RCRA is so broad that no additional remedy should be
implied. 178
The leading case upholding an implied right of contribution under
section 7003 is United States v. Valentine.179 The United States filed
a complaint under RCRA section 7003 against ten defendants, seeking
to require investigation and remediation of a petroleum-contaminated
site in Wyoming. Eight defendants entered into a consent decree with
the government under section 7003 to conduct the investigation and
cleanup, and those eight then moved for leave to assert cross-claims
against non-settling original defendants and third-party complaints
against various non-parties who allegedly contributed to the contami-
nation. The court granted the motion, ruling that the settling defend-
ants had a right to contribution, impliedly under section 7003 and as a
matter of federal common law.18O
The Valentine court relied heavily on the statute's broad grant of
authority and its legislative history in finding that a right to contribu-
tion arises from section 7003 by clear implication. Quoting language
from Price that had been quoted with approval in the Senate report on
the 1984 amendments to RCRA, the court found that section 7003
granted sweeping authority to award all relief necessary to eliminate
endangerment posed by toxic wastes. "Courts should not undermine
the will of Congress by either withholding relief or granting it grudg-
176. 32 ERC 1737 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
177. The government did not sue under RCRA section 7003. Rather, section 3008, 42
U.S.C. § 6928, is the primary federal enforcement provision under RCRA. Where
a defendant has committed a violation of RCRA subtitle C or of regulations issued
thereunder, section 3008 authorizes various remedies, including administrative
orders, civil and criminal penalties, and injunctive relief. Id. § 6928 (2000). The
defendant in Production Plated Plastics was seeking contribution for penalties
and the cost of injunctive relief to come into compliance; it was not seeking contri-
bution for the costs of abating an imminent and substantial endangerment.
Prod. Plated, 32 ERC at 1739.
178. Prod. Plated, 32 ERC at 1740.
179. 856 F. Supp. 627 (D. Wyo. 1994). Indeed, it apparently is the only reported deci-
sion squarely so holding.
180. Id. at 632-37.
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ingly."18 1 Since courts had awarded equitable restitution to the
United States to recover costs under section 7003, the court reasoned
that likewise "contribution is an equitable remedy designed to prevent
unjust enrichment, and there is no legitimate reason for courts to
grant the former remedy and yet deny the latter."
18 2
The court in Valentine also stated that since joint and several lia-
bility is the rule in section 7003 cases, the right to contribution should
follow, since both are part of the modern common law of nuisance.
18 3
Citing to CERCLA cases finding that contribution is an integral com-
ponent of joint and several liability, the court ruled that "contribution
must be recognized precisely because joint and several liability is the
rule in RCRA cases."
18 4
Finally, the court found that contribution serves the purposes un-
derlying RCRA section 7003. In the absence of contribution, the set-
tling defendants would be penalized for stepping forward to conduct
the cleanup, because they would bear the full costs of the cleanup
without recourse against other responsible parties, while the non-set-
tling defendants and other responsible parties would be rewarded for
refusing to participate in the cleanup. According to the Valentine
court, contribution would encourage early settlements with the gov-
ernment and expeditious cleanups, by affording settling defendants
the chance to recoup a portion of the cleanup expenses later from
other responsible parties.18 5
181. Id. at 633 (quoting Price, 688 F.2d 204, 214 (3d Cir. 1982)). This same language
from Price was quoted in the Senate report on the 1984 amendments to RCRA. S.
REP. No. 98-284, at 59 (1984). The court also quoted from the legislative history
for the 1980 amendments: "[S]ection 7003 is essentially a codification of common
law public nuisance remedies." S. REP. No. 96-172, at 5 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019, 5023. As the Valentine court noted, the legislative history of
RCRA as originally enacted in 1976 contains no specific discussion of the reach of
or rationale for section 7003, so courts typically have relied upon the legislative
history for the 1980 and 1984 amendments. Valentine, 856 F. Supp. at 633. See
also United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 738 (8th Cir. 1986)
(observing that the district court had relied on the legislative history of the 1980
and 1984 amendments in order to determine the rationale and reach of the
amendments).
182. Valentine, 856 F. Supp. at 633.
183. Id. at 633-34 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A cmt. B (1965)).
184. Id. at 634 (citing Colo. v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1485, 1490 (D. Colo. 1985),
County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508, 1515-16 (10th Cir. 1991), and
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 228 (W.D. Mo.
1985)).
185. Id. at 634. The court assumed that if there -were no settlement, the court could
apportion responsibility for the costs among all the liable defendants. For exam-
ple, one defendant could be required to perform the entire cleanup and the other
parties could be required to pay for their shares of the costs. Id. at 634-35 n.7.
However, the court did not cite any authority by which the court could apportion
responsibility or that would guide how such apportionment should be decided in
the absence of a contribution claim, and the court did not address how the non-
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The Valentine court also concluded that a right to contribution ex-
ists as a matter of federal common law in a section 7003 case. Stating
that a court can formulate federal common law where it is necessary
to protect "unique federal interests" or where Congress has authorized
the courts to develop substantive law, the Valentine court looked to
CERCLA and its case law by analogy.1 8 6 Prior to the 1986 amend-
ments, CERCLA contained no express contribution provision. Never-
theless, some courts found a right to contribution on the basis that
Congress intended courts to develop a substantive law of CERCLA
contribution as a matter of federal common law and that it would en-
hance unique federal interests-namely, encouraging expeditious
cleanups by private parties, and reducing government cleanup and lit-
igation expenses.18 7 Saying that the same reasoning applies to
RCRA, the court in Valentine ruled that Congress had authority to
recognize a federal common law right to contribution in actions
brought under RCRA section 7003, and doing so would serve the same
unique federal interests of promoting faster cleanups and preserving
the public treasury.'8 8
In Valentine, the court explained that Supreme Court precedent
supported recognition of a right to contribution in RCRA section 7003
cases. The court distinguished Texas Industries and Northwest Air-
lines because, unlike the statutes at issue in those cases, RCRA does
not contain detailed, specific and comprehensive remedial provisions
evincing a Congressional intent not to authorize additional remedies:
"To the contrary, this case involves a statute that mentions only one
specific remedy, injunctions, and clearly authorizes the federal courts
to fashion supplemental equitable remedies."18 9 Rather, the court fol-
lowed Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insurance of Wausau,190
in which the Supreme Court held there was an implied right of contri-
bution in securities cases brought under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. The Valentine court found that recognizing a
party responsible persons could be required to join the suit and be subject to
apportionment.
186. Id. at 635-36.
187. Id. (citing United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1268-69 (D.
Del. 1986), and Sand Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670 F. Supp. 913,
916-17 (N.D. Okla. 1987)). Congress confirmed the availability of a right to con-
tribution by expressly adding section 113(f) in 1986. H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at
79 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861. Prior to the addition of
section 113(f), not all of the courts which held that CERCLA provided for contri-
bution did so based on federal common law. Some implied a right to contribution
from section 107. See Conservation Chem., 619 F. Supp. at 223-29 (implied);
Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 31 (E.D. Mo. 1985)
(implied).
188. 856 F. Supp. at 636.
189. Id. at 637.
190. 508 U.S. 286 (1993).
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right to contribution under section 7003 was fully consistent with Mu-
sick, emphasizing that, as with respect to Rule 10b-5 private causes of
action, section 7003 leaves to the courts the precise remedies availa-
ble; that since CERCLA expressly grants a right to contribution, co-
herence and consistency demand such an equitable remedy in
analogous RCRA cases under section 7003 as well; and that contribu-
tion will advance rather than frustrate the purpose of RCRA.191
The following year, the court in Olin Corp. v. Fisons PLC 192 up-
held a third-party complaint for contribution under section
7002(a)(1)(B) in the context of a citizen suit pursuant to section
7002(a)(1)(B). Plaintiff Olin Corp., owner of a chemical plant, pursu-
ant to section 7002(a)(1)(B) sued certain prior owners and operators of
the plant, including Nor-Am Chemical Co., seeking to force defendants
to conduct the cleanup of the plant. Nor-Am asserted a third-party
complaint under section 7002(a)(1)(B) against Stepan Company, an-
other former owner which had settled with Olin prior to suit, seeking
an order requiring Stepan to conduct the cleanup. The court denied
Stepan's motion to dismiss Nor-Am's third-party complaint, citing
Valentine as authority for upholding a contribution claim by a defen-
dant liable under RCRA for conducting a cleanup.
193
B. Later Cases Deny Contribution
All of the cases discussed in Part IV.A above, including Valentine,
were decided prior to the Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Meghrig.
Since Valentine, there has been little reported case law pertaining to
contribution in section 7003 cases. However, although Meghrig was
not a contribution case, post-Meghrig courts consistently have invoked
Meghrig in ruling that there is no right to contribution in citizen suits
under section 7002(a)(1)(B). An example is Davenport v. Neely.
19 4
Plaintiffs-neighbors brought suit against the current owners and oper-
ators of a tire recycling facility pursuant to RCRA section
7002(a)(1)(A), alleging violations of RCRA and seeking removal of
abandoned tires and other wastes. Defendants filed a third-party
complaint for contribution against multiple third-party defendants,
arguing that plaintiffs could have brought their action pursuant to
section 7002(a)(1)(B) instead of section 7002(a)(1)(A) and that the
191. Valentine, 856 F. Supp. at 636-37.
192. No. Civil A. 93-11166-MLW, 1995 WL 811961 (D. Mass. April 24, 1995).
193. Id. at *12 n.19. The court expressed doubts about whether Olin could make Nor-
Am jointly and severally liable for the cleanup under section 7002(a)(1)(B), inter
alia, because Olin itself was a responsible party. Id. at *9-12. If Nor-Am were
merely severally liable to Olin, the court explained, there would be no need for
contribution against Stepan. Id. at *4. But the court allowed the third-party
complaint to stand on the premise that Olin might succeed in obtaining relief
that would make Nor-Am fully responsible for the cleanup. Id. at *12.
194. 7 F. Supp. 2d 1219 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
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court should recognize contribution under section 7002(a)(1)(B) just as
the Valentine court had found a right to contribution under section
7003.195 The court dismissed the third-party complaint, primarily in
reliance on Meghrig. Equating the third-party complaint with a suit
to recover future cleanup costs, the Davenport court ruled that the Su-
preme Court's reasoning in Meghrig-specifically, that Congress
knows how to provide for recovery of cleanup costs and declined to so
provide in RCRA-precludes recovery of future costs via contribu-
tion. 196 The court concluded, "While such a result may seem inequita-
ble, such a conclusion is mandated by existing law."19 7
Similarly, in FCA Associates v. Texaco, Inc.,198 plaintiffs sued Tex-
aco under section 7002(a)(1)(B), seeking cleanup of a petroleum-con-
taminated site. The court dismissed Texaco's third-party complaint
seeking contribution under RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B), ruling that
Texaco lacked standing to assert such a claim because there is no
cause of action for contribution under RCRA.199
195. Id. at 1224-27.
196. Id. at 1229. The court also relied on lower court decisions holding that recovery
of cleanup costs is not available under RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B), including
Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 1995), and Andritz Sprout-Bauer, Inc. v.
Beazer East, Inc., 174 F.R.D. 609 (M.D. Pa. 1997).
197. Davenport, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1230. The court noted somewhat cryptically that
other claims, perhaps under state law, might be available for defendants to force
other responsible parties to share in the costs of cleanup. Id. at 1230 n.4.
198. No. 03-CV-6083T, 2005 WL 735959 (W.D.N.Y. March 31, 2005).
199. Id. at *3. Not all courts, though, have flatly rejected the notions of contribution
and cost allocation in RCRA imminent hazard cases. In Waste Inc. Cost Recovery
Group v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 51 F. Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Ind. 1999), the EPA
issued a unilateral administrative order under CERCLA section 106 to the mem-
bers of the Group to implement the EPA's selected remedy at a waste disposal
facility in Michigan. After implementing the remedy, the Group brought a RCRA
contribution claim against other allegedly liable parties urging that the EPA
could have issued the order under RCRA section 7003 instead of CERCLA section
106, so Valentine should provide for contribution in this case. The court dis-
missed the RCRA contribution claim, stating that a necessary prerequisite for
contribution under section 7003 is liability under that statute, either in the form
of a settlement or judgment. But the court cited Valentine with seeming approval
and did not squarely find that Meghrig or Avondale was dispositive. 51 F. Supp.
2d at 941-42.
In Nashua Corp. v. Norton Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 330 (N.D.N.Y. 2000), the
plaintiff owner of a contaminated industrial site sued the former owner under
CERCLA and RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B). The court found both parties to be
liable under CERCLA and allocated past and future response costs 90% to defen-
dant and 10% to plaintiff. The court permitted plaintiff to maintain the RCRA
citizen suit claim despite having contributed to the contamination, but refused to
allow plaintiff to recover any costs already incurred, pre- or post-complaint. How-
ever, the court did award injunctive relief that paralleled the CERCLA judgment:
defendant was ordered to pay 90% of future response cost bills presented by
plaintiff, which was performing the work, unless defendant filed objections to the
bill within a specified time period. Plaintiff also was awarded its litigation attor-
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Other cases likewise have relied upon Meghrig in refusing to recog-
nize a right to contribution in cases brought under RCRA. In United
States v. Domestic Industries,20 0 the United States sued defendants
pursuant to RCRA section 3008 seeking civil penalties for violations of
oil management requirements under RCRA. Defendants filed a third-
party complaint against their suppliers, seeking contribution for any
penalties assessed against defendants, relying on Valentine. But the
court dismissed the third-party complaint, ruling that Meghrig and
Davenport instruct that there should be no contribution claims in
RCRA cases because Congress had provided for no such remedy.
20
Some commentators likewise have taken the position post-Meghrig
that contribution claims are foreclosed to defendants in imminent haz-
ard cases under RCRA.202
A recent case, City of Bangor v. Citizens Communications Co.,203
illustrates the contrast between CERCLA and RCRA with respect to
contribution. The plaintiff-city sued the corporate successor to the for-
mer owner of a manufactured gas plant, under CERCLA section 107
and RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B), alleging the defendant was responsi-
ble for coal tar contamination in the river. The complaint sought to
force defendant to abate the contamination or pay for the city's abate-
ment work. Defendant counterclaimed under CERCLA section
113(f)(1) and RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B), claiming the city also was
liable for the tar contamination in the river and should share the bur-
den of remediation. The court found that both the city and defendant
were liable parties under CERCLA, as owners and arrangers, and
under RCRA, as contributors to the tar contamination.
20 4
Bangor was decided after Aviall but before Atlantic Research, so
because the city was a responsible party under CERCLA and had
neither been sued under CERCLA nor settled with the government to
discharge CERCLA liability prior to initiating the case, no CERCLA
ney fees as a substantially prevailing party, pursuant to RCRA section 7002(e).
116 F. Supp. 2d at 359.
200. 32 F. Supp. 2d 855 (E.D. Va. 1999).
201. Id. at 871. The government in Domestic Industries did not sue under RCRA sec-
tion 7003, and the defendant was not seeking contribution toward abatement of
an imminent and substantial endangerment.
202. See Nicholas J. Wallwork & Mark E. Freeze, Spreading the Costs of Enuironmen-
tal Cleanup-Contribution Claims Under CERCLA and RCRA, 2007 ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY: ENVIRONMENTAL AND Toxic TORT LITIGATION 667, 690-91
(stating that "the continued viability of Valentine is in doubt and that subsequent
decisions have overwhelmingly rejected a right of contribution under RCRA").
The article goes on to note that responsible parties may be able to obtain the
"functional equivalent" of contribution by asserting a claim for injunctive relief
under section 7002(a)(1)(B), citing cases which permit responsible party plaintiffs
to maintain section 7002(a)(1)(B) citizen suits. Id. at 691 n.77.
203. 437 F. Supp. 2d 180 (D. Me. 2006).
204. Id. at 182, 211-12.
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section 113(f) claim was viable and there was a real question whether
the city could maintain its CERCLA section 107 claim. The court,
though, held that the city could maintain a claim under CERCLA sec-
tion 107, finding that section 107 allows "any other person"-not just
innocent plaintiffs-to bring an action for cost recovery, and that
preventing responsible parties from seeking cost allocation would dis-
courage CERCLA's goal of promoting private party remediations. 2O5
The court permitted the defendant to counterclaim for contribution
under CERCLA section 113(f). The court went on to allocate past and
future response cost responsibility under CERCLA: a 60% equitable
share to defendant and a 40% share to the city.20 6 In this private
CERCLA action, because both the plaintiff and defendant were re-
sponsible parties, the court noted that the liability of the parties to
each other was several, not joint.
20 7
Pursuant to the parties' claims against each other under RCRA's
imminent hazard citizen suit provision, however, the court held both
parties jointly and severally liable to remedy the tar contamination,
since the harm was not divisible. Though the liability of the parties
under CERCLA was several and not joint, the court nonetheless
adopted the general rule of joint and several liability in RCRA cases,
reasoning that it would be difficult to craft an injunction that would
abate the endangerment unless both parties were responsible for the
entire mandatory injunctive relief. As the court explained, if one
party did not do its share of the remedy, then even if the other party
did, it likely would not abate the endangerment. 20 8 In so ruling, the
court noted that "the possibility of contribution under RCRA is likely
foreclosed under Meghrig."20 9
In Bangor, the consequences of not having a contribution right
under RCRA probably were not critical for the parties, as the court
presumed that the 60% - 40% CERCLA allocation would likely apply
to any future costs incurred in complying with the RCRA injunc-
tion.2 10 But what would the court have done if there had been no
CERCLA claim available, such as if the contamination were petro-
leum-based rather than coal-based? All the court did under RCRA
was hold both parties jointly and severally liable for doing the work
necessary to abate the endangering conditions. How would the re-
sponsibility, and costs, for doing the work have been allocated between
the liable parties? In the absence of a recognized claim for allocating
205. Id. at 220-23.
206. Id. at 225-26. The court used equitable factors to determine the relative shares,
as contemplated by CERCLA §113(f)(1). Id. at 224 n.24.
207. Id. at 219.
208. Id. at 219-20.
209. Id. at 220 n.18.
210. Id.
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the responsibilities and costs, via contribution or otherwise, the par-
ties seemingly would be left to themselves to work it out, without any
recognized legal paradigm for doing so.
V. COURTS SHOULD RECOGNIZE CONTRIBUTION CLAIMS
UNDER RCRA'S IMMINENT HAZARD PROVISIONS
Courts generally have refused to recognize a contribution claim by
a defendant in RCRA imminent hazard cases to allocate cleanup costs
among responsible parties. The consequences are stark. If there is no
claim for contribution recognized for a defendant under RCRA, then:
A. The United States or a citizen suit plaintiff can choose one re-
sponsible party to sue, thus forcing that person to shoulder the entire
burden of taking action to abate the endangerment at a site, with no
cause of action available to share a portion of the cleanup responsibil-
ity with any of the many other responsible parties who contributed to
the presence of the wastes at the site-perhaps to a much greater ex-
tent than did the targeted defendant.
B. Where multiple responsible parties are sued by the United
States or a citizen suit plaintiff, there is neither a recognized claim by
which the defendants can force allocation of responsibilities for the
cleanup among them, nor a recognized legal paradigm for a court to
follow in making such an allocation. As a result, unless the parties
can reach a voluntary agreement regarding how they will divide the
work or the costs, who must do the work and bear the costs may be left
to the whim of the plaintiff when deciding whom to enforce the judg-
ment against.
C. As the Bangor case reflects, where the plaintiff itself is a con-
tributor to the endangerment and hence a responsible party, there
likewise is no established legal paradigm for the court to follow in
awarding relief, and there is nothing to guide the parties legally even
if they wanted to try to reach a voluntary agreement regarding alloca-
tion of the work or costs.
It is manifestly unfair for one defendant to bear the entire cleanup
responsibility at a site, while other contributors to the contamination
are free from such responsibility. As Dean William Prosser criticized
the no-contribution rule more generally: "There is obvious lack of
sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire burden of a loss,
for which two defendants were equally, unintentionally responsible, to
be shouldered onto one alone, according to the accident of a successful
levy of execution, the existence of liability insurance, the plaintiffs
whim or spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer, while the
latter goes scot free."2 1 1 Further, where the targeted defendant has
211. PROSSER, supra note 149, § 50, at 307. There certainly are more opportunities for
collusion and "gaming" the system where no contribution is available. For exam-
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no possibility of recouping a fair share of her costs in cleaning up the
site from any other responsible party, she may well choose to vigor-
ously defend against the RCRA imminent hazard suit, thus driving up
litigation costs and delaying the cleanup of the site. Additionally, in
cases where there are multiple responsible parties, the absence of any
recognized legal claim or paradigm for allocating responsibilities and
costs among them leaves both judges and litigants without legal gui-
dance for adjudicating or settling the case, likewise leading to poten-
tial injustice and delays both in resolving the dispute and in
remediation of the sites.
A review of the cases discussed in Part IV above reveals that courts
have cited two main reasons for refusing to recognize a claim for con-
tribution among responsible parties in RCRA imminent hazard cases:
(1) unlike CERCLA, RCRA does not include an express provision au-
thorizing contribution, and Supreme Court precedents such as North-
west Airlines and Texas Industries have been interpreted as auguring
against implying a claim for contribution under federal statutes; and
(2) the Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Meghrig, which bars the re-
covery of past cleanup costs under section 7002(a)(1)(B), has been in-
terpreted as foreclosing the remedy of contribution as well. In light of
the Supreme Court's decision last year in Atlantic Research that once
again makes cost allocation broadly available to responsible parties in
CERCLA cases, courts should re-examine their bases for denying con-
tribution claims in RCRA imminent hazard cases. This part of the
Article sets forth why courts can and should recognize (1) a contribu-
tion claim under section 7003, by implication and under federal com-
mon law, and (2) a claim in the nature of contribution based on the
express terms of section 7002(a)(1)(B).
A. Section 7003
Only the Administrator of the EPA on behalf of the United States
is authorized to bring suit under section 7003. The express language
of section 7003 does not provide for a cause of action by any other
private person or governmental entity and makes no mention of con-
tribution. 21 2 As Valentine showed, however, that section 7003 does
not expressly grant a right to contribution is not dispositive of
whether a person sued by the United States under section 7003 has a
ple, assume Y is the current owner of a site, Z is the former owner, and both are
equally responsible for contributing to its contamination. Y persuades innocent
neighbor X to sue Z under RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B), resulting in a judgment
requiring Z, jointly and severally liable, to clean up the site alone. Y benefits
from a cleaned up site at Z's expense.
212. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (2000); see, e.g., Prisco v. New York, 902 F. Supp. 374, 392
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that section 7003 does not authorize a private cause of
action).
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right to contribution. The Supreme Court has made clear that a right
to contribution may arise from a statute, not only expressly, but also
by clear implication, or through the power of federal courts to fashion
a federal common law of contribution.
2 13
Decided just one month apart in 1981, Northwest Airlines and
Texas Industries remain the leading Supreme Court cases regarding
whether to recognize an implied right of contribution or a federal com-
mon law remedy of contribution, where a federal statute does not ex-
pressly provide for a contribution right.214 In Northwest Airlines, an
airline had been held liable to female flight attendants for back pay
because collectively bargained wage differentials for male and female
attendants were found to violate the Equal Pay Act and Title VII. The
airline then filed suit seeking contribution against the attendants' un-
ions. The Supreme Court dismissed the airline's complaint, holding
that there is no implied right of action for contribution under either
statute and that there is no federal common law right of contribution
from the unions.2 15 In Texas Industries, a concrete purchaser sued a
Louisiana concrete manufacturer, alleging price fixing violations of
the Sherman and Clayton Acts and seeking treble damages. The orig-
inal defendant filed a third-party complaint against other Louisiana
concrete manufacturers seeking contribution in the event it should be
held liable to plaintiff. The Supreme Court upheld dismissal of the
third-party complaint, holding that there was neither an implied right
of contribution under the antitrust statutes nor a federal common law
right to contribution in that case.
2 16
1. Implied Right of Contribution
In both cases, the Court articulated the same basic test for deter-
mining whether a right to contribution arises by implication from a
federal statute. The ultimate question is whether Congress intended
to establish a right to contribution, despite not having expressly so
provided. 217 Factors relevant to this inquiry include: the language of
the statute; legislative history; the underlying purpose and structure
213. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 638 (1981); Nw. Airlines, Inc.
v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981).
214. Tex. Indus., 451 U.S. 630; Nw. Airlines, 451 U.S. 77; see Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Aviall Serv., Inc. 543 U.S. 157, 162 (2004). The court in Cooper Industries did not
decide whether CERCLA section 107 or section 113(f) gave rise to an implied
contribution claim for a responsible party which voluntarily incurred cleanup
costs, but stated that it was "debatable" in light of Texas Industries and North-
west Airlines. Id.
215. Nw. Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91-98.
216. Tex. Indus., 451 U.S. at 638-47.
217. Id. at 639; Nw. Airlines, 451 U.S. at 90-91.
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of the statutory scheme; and the likelihood that Congress intended to
supercede or supplement existing state remedies.
2 18
With respect to RCRA section 7003, each of these indicia of Con-
gressional intent-statutory language, legislative history, the under-
lying purpose and structure of the legislative scheme, and the
inadequacy of state law remedies-all point strongly in favor of imply-
ing a right to contribution for parties liable under section 7003.
a. Statutory Language & Legislative History
While it does not use the term "contribution" expressly, section
7003 broadly empowers courts not only to "restrain" but also to "take
such other action as may be necessary."21 9 Congress, by using such
language in section 7003, intended to invest the courts with expansive
equity powers to grant all relief necessary to protect public health and
the environment from the risks and effects of discarded wastes.
220
The legislative history echoes this broad grant of equitable power, em-
phasizing that courts under section 7003 have broad and flexible pow-
ers to award affirmative equitable relief.22 1 The legislative history
goes on to state that "section 7003 is essentially a codification of com-
mon law public nuisance remedies," incorporating theories and reme-
dies that have been used for centuries.2 22 Contribution has long been
available in equity, even where no right of contribution existed at
law.223 Modern public nuisance common law clearly favors contribu-
tion and apportionment of liability among multiple liable parties.
224
Section 7003 makes wide categories of parties subject to liability,
including past and present handlers, storers, treaters, transporters,
and disposers of solid or hazardous wastes. 2 25 As a result, multiple
parties may be subject to liability for the presence of waste at the
same site. Courts have invoked their broad equitable powers and the
218. Tex. Indus., 451 U.S. at 639; Nw. Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91. At least the first three
are common factors for ascertaining legislative intent in interpreting statutes.
2A, NORMAN SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.05 (6th ed.
2000).
219. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2000).
220. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 213-14 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Con-
servation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 199 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
221. Congress, by enacting section 7003, "intended to confer upon the courts the au-
thority to grant affirmative equitable relief to the extent necessary to eliminate
any risks posed by toxic wastes." S. REP. No. 98-284, at 59 (1984) (quoting Price,
688 F.2d at 213-14).
222. S. REP. No. 96-172, at 5 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019, 5023.
223. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A cmt. c (1979); Flint & Moore, supra note
147, at 11; Hernandez, supra note 147, at 100.
224. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1979); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY (2000); see Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers
Union, 451 U.S. 77, 86-87 n.17 (1981).
225. 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (2000).
[Vol. 87:420
RCRA'S IMMINENT HAZARD PROVISIONS
common law of public nuisance to impose joint and several liability
under RCRA section 7003, despite no express mention ofjoint and sev-
eral liability in the statute or the legislative history.226 Since the
right of contribution cannot arise in the absence of joint and several
liability,22 7 it is hardly surprising that Congress did not expressly
mention contribution in the statutory terms and the legislative his-
tory. But if Congressional intent for joint and several liability can be
gleaned from the terms of the statute and its legislative history, then
a right of contribution should be similarly implied. While joint and
several liability does not automatically translate into a right of contri-
bution under all circumstances, 2 28 the statute's sweeping grant of eq-
uitable powers and remedies to the court, and its roots in common law
public nuisance, evince a strong intent toward recognizing an implied
right of contribution under section 7003.
b. Structure & Purpose
Further, implying a right to contribution under section 7003 is con-
sistent with the structure and underlying purpose of section 7003.
The purpose of RCRA section 7003 is to provide the EPA with a tool to
force responsible parties promptly to remediate wastes which may be
endangering the public or the environment. 2 29 Recognizing a right to
contribution would facilitate early settlements with the United States
and avoid delays in cleaning up contaminated sites. If a defendant
knows it has the chance to recoup cleanup costs in excess of its fair
226. See United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 199 (W.D. Mo.
1985) (finding that Congress has authorized imposition ofjoint and several liabil-
ity). See also cases decided under RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B). Me. Peoples Alliance v.
Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 298 (1st Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 93
(2007); Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 301 n.37 (5th Cir. 2001); Aurora Nat'l
Bank v. Tri Star Mktg., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1020, 1034 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
227. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 11 cmt. c
(2000); HysON, supra note 65, at 267-73.
228. See Conservation Chem., 619 F. Supp. at 226. To the extent the court in Valen-
tine equated the existence of joint and several liability to the right to contribu-
tion, such a syllogism is overly simplistic. United States v. Valentine, 856 F.
Supp. 627, 634 (D. Wyo. 1994).
229. It is often said that the primary purpose of RCRA is to regulate the generation,
transportation, treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous waste. See, e.g.,
Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996) (noting that the statute "gov-
erns the treatment, storage, and disposal of solid and hazardous waste"). Indeed,
that is true with respect to subtitle C of RCRA. But RCRA covers more than the
management and regulation of hazardous waste. The language and legislative
history of RCRA's imminent hazard provisions make clear that their purpose is to
protect health and the environment by providing the government and private
plaintiffs with the authority to force prompt cleanups of contaminated sites by
those responsible for the contamination. See Note, Hazardous Waste-A Right of
Contribution Under RCRA: U.S. v. Valentine, 30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 489, 504
(1995).
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share, that defendant will have an incentive to settle and seek contri-
bution. On the other hand, if the defendant has no chance to recoup
any portion of the cleanup costs, the defendant will be more inclined to
litigate every issue and exhaust every defense in an effort to avoid
liability to the government and the resulting cleanup costs responsi-
bility, thus increasing the government's litigation expenses and delay-
ing cleanup of the site.23
0
Moreover, given the expansive equitable powers afforded to courts
by Congress under section 7003, Supreme Court precedent indicates
that it would be improper to limit a court's traditional equitable pow-
ers, in the absence of express language or clear Congressional intent
to the contrary. 23 1 As discussed above, an award of contribution is
among an equity court's traditional powers.
c. State Law
Contribution for cleanup liability under section 7003 would not in-
trude upon an area traditionally relegated to state law. Section 7003
was enacted because existing authorities, including state law, were
not adequate to address the problems posed by sites contaminated
with solid or hazardous wastes. 23 2 Section 7003's liability scheme is a
significant expansion of the common law in order to address problems
state nuisance law often could not.2 33 For example, in many states,
the efficacy of a nuisance claim is blunted by, inter alia, the need to
balance the reasonableness of the defendant's activities; causation
hurdles, particularly where there may be multiple contributors to the
problem; and statutes of limitations.234 Hence, section 7003 often
provides the government with a cause of action or remedy where no
such claim or remedy could be maintained under state law. Concomi-
tantly, a defendant in a section 7003 action often may not have any
viable claim under state law against other parties who may neverthe-
less be liable under section 7003. Accordingly, this factor also favors
implication of a right to contribution under section 7003.
2. Federal Common Law
The Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries Courts also outlined
the circumstances under which a federal court has a responsibility to
formulate a federal common law right to contribution. Although fed-
eral courts are of limited jurisdiction, they have authority to develop
230. See Valentine, 856 F. Supp. at 634, 636; Hazardous Waste, supra note 229.
231. See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291 (1960).
232. See S. REP. No. 96-172, at 5 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019, 5023.
233. Id.
234. See Percival et al., supra note 62, at 75-76, 87; Ronald Aronovsky, Federalism
and CERCLA: Rethinking the Role of Federal Law in Private Cleanup Cost Dis-
putes, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 71-79 (2006).
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federal common law in essentially two instances: (1) where it is neces-
sary to protect "uniquely federal interests," and (2) where Congress
has given the courts power to develop substantive law.235
There are strong indicia of Congressional intent authorizing fed-
eral courts to develop federal common law to fill in the gaps of section
7003. The statutory language makes multiple categories of persons
liable for contributing to the endangering conditions at a site,2 3 6 yet is
silent with respect to critical issues relevant to such multiple party
liability. These include the nature of the liability (e.g., joint and sev-
eral or just several) and, if joint and several, whether one party must
bear all the responsibility for a cleanup while other responsible par-
ties get off scot-free or whether there should be a right of contribution.
The language of the statute and the legislative history show that
Congress intended the courts to develop substantive law, drawing on
common law principles, to fill in the gaps of section 7003. Section
7003 broadly authorizes courts to use their full equitable powers in
granting relief, permitting them to order defendants "to take such ac-
tion as may be necessary."23 7, The Senate report on the 1980 amend-
ment to section 7003 made clear that "section 7003 is essentially a
codification of common law nuisance remedies," yet Congress also
made clear that section 7003 "should not be construed solely with re-
spect to the common law" and should not be constrained by common
law limitations. Rather, section 7003 is intended to provide an en-
hanced liability and remedial scheme. 238 In essence, Congress was
exhorting the courts to build upon the common law in order to fully
implement the expansive equitable powers and remedies outlined in
RCRA's imminent hazard provisions.239 Hence, courts should recog-
235. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 640-43 (1981); Nw. Airlines,
Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95-96 (1981). See generally EDWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §§ 6.1-6.3 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing fed-
eral courts' authority to develop common law).
236. See 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (2000). The statute extends liability to "any person (in-
cluding any past or present generator, past or present transporter, or past or
present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility) who has
contributed or who is contributing to" the handling, storage, treatment, transpor-
tation or disposal of solid or hazardous waste that may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to health or the environment. Id.
237. Id. § 6973; United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 164-67 (4th Cir.
1984); United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 211 (3d Cir. 1982).
238. S. REP. No. 96-172, at 5 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.A.N.N. 5019, 5023. For
example, "contributing to" should be construed more liberally than common law
theories of causation. Id. See Waste Indus., 734 F.2d at 166-68 (noting that Con-
gress's intent was to expand upon common law in establishing liability).
239. See also 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) (2000) ("Nothing in this section shall restrict any
right which any person ... may have under any statute or common law . . ").
When this savings provision was added in 1984, an opponent noted that it would
allow the development of federal common law. H.R. REP. No. 98-198, at 20
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nize a federal common law right to contribution in favor of a defendant
in a RCRA section 7003 case. 240
3. Northwest Airlines & Texas Industries: Distinguishable and
Flawed
In neither Northwest Airlines nor Texas Industries did the Court
recognize a right of contribution impliedly or under federal common
law. Both cases are distinguishable, though, because they involved
statutory provisions far different from RCRA section 7003, and their
holdings do not preclude recognition of an implied claim for contribu-
tion or a contribution right pursuant to federal common law in a sec-
tion 7003 case. Further, their approach to ascertaining Congressional
intent regarding the availability of contribution claims under federal
statutes is flawed.
In both cases, the Court relied heavily on the fact that the statutes
in question set forth comprehensive, detailed remedial schemes.
Under such circumstances, said the Court, Congressional intent to of-
fer additional remedies should not be implied from the statute or fash-
ioned under federal common law. 241 The provisions of the Sherman
(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5647 (supplemental views of Rep.
Sensenbrenner).
Although courts applying federal common law may look to state law, the need
for uniformity, and the vagaries and inadequacies of state law with respect to
contaminated sites, strongly indicate that courts should develop a federal com-
mon law of contribution applicable to RCRA imminent hazard cases. See United
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979) (noting factors for determining
whether to apply federal common law or refer to state law when evaluating issues
related to a federal program).
240. In Valentine, the court also held that a federal common law right of contribution
would enhance "unique federal interests" by encouraging defendants to settle
quickly with the government, implead other responsible parties, and perform the
cleanup privately, thus preserving the public treasury and fostering faster clean-
ups. United States v. Valentine, 856 F. Supp. 627, 635-36 (D. Wyo. 1994) (citing
United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258 (D. Del. 1986) (recogniz-
ing federal common law contribution claim in CERCLA case)). Whether such in-
terests are "unique" enough to warrant development of a federal common law
right to contribution, however, is questionable in light of Supreme Court cases
seemingly circumscribing the scope of "unique federal interests" to matters such
as interstate and international disputes or admiralty law. See Tex. Indus., 451
U.S. at 640-43; Nw. Airlines, 451 U.S. at 95-98; 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4518 (1996) (noting trend in recent Su-
preme Court decisions reflects very restrained attitude toward formulation of fed-
eral common law); see also Mark A. Johnson, Contribution Among Defendants in
Actions Under Section 7003 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 2 Wis.
ENVTL. L.J. 225, 231 (1995) (agreeing with Valentine court's conclusion to imply
right of contribution, but questioning conclusion that contribution right exists
under federal common law, noting that encouraging cleanups and settlements
and reducing enforcement costs do not seem like "unique federal interests").
241. Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 644-45; Nw. Airlines, 451 U.S. at 93-94; see also 19
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 240, § 4516 (noting if statute is detailed, it is less
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and Clayton Acts at issue in Texas Industries subjected a violator of
the antitrust laws to specific penalties, terms of imprisonment, and
treble damages.2 42 Similarly, the Equal Pay Act and Title VII provi-
sions at issue in Northwest Airlines subjected an unlawfully discrimi-
nating employer to specific penalties, terms of imprisonment, and
back pay damages. 2 43 By contrast, as discussed above, RCRA section
7003's remedies are stated in broad, expansive terms, including au-
thorization "to take such other action as may be necessary."24 4
RCRA's federal enforcement provision, section 3008, provides for civil
and criminal penalties based on violations of certain RCRA statutory
and regulatory requirements, but it has no applicability to section
7003.245 Implying a contribution remedy in section 7003 cases does
no violence to the statutory remedial scheme established by Congress;
rather, as discussed above, contribution is consistent with the RCRA
remedial scheme in imminent hazard cases. 2 46
More troubling, though, is that the Court in both Northwest Air-
lines and Texas Industries supported its decisions not to imply a con-
tribution right by finding that the claimants were not members of a
likely that Congress intended courts to recognize a cause of action impliedly or
under federal common law).
242. Clayton Act § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000) (providing for treble damages for vio-
lation of antitrust laws); Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (providing that
illegal restraints of trade constitute felonies, punishable with fines and
imprisonment).
243. Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(a)-(c) (2000) (providing for double damages and
unpaid wages); Equal Employment Opportunity Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(2000) (providing that Title VII damages include back pay).
244. 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (2000).
245. Id. § 6928(b) (2000). For example, RCRA section 3008(a) limits authority for
compliance orders to violations of any requirements of "this subchapter," mean-
ing subtitle C. Id. § 6928(a). The provisions pertaining to criminal sanctions and
civil penalties are likewise limited to violations of subtitle C. Id. § 6928(d), (g);
see United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting
that section 7003, unlike subtitle C, does not regulate conduct but regulates and
mitigates endangerments).
246. The Meghrig Court observed that "where Congress has provided 'elaborate en-
forcement provisions' for remedying the violation of a federal statute, as Congress
has done with RCRA and CERCLA, it cannot be assumed that Congress intended
to authorize by implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens suing
under the statute." Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 487-88 (1996) (quot-
ing Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1,
14 (1981)). The holding in Meghrig, though, was that section 7002(a)(1)(B) can-
not be interpreted to allow a citizen to recover past cleanup costs incurred prior to
initiating suit. Id. at 488. The opinion did not address contribution at all. As
discussed more fully in Part V.B infra, RCRA's imminent hazard provisions, in
contrast to RCRA § 3008, do not have elaborate enforcement mechanisms, and
Meghrig should not stand in the way of recognition of a contribution remedy in
RCRA imminent hazard cases.
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class for whose benefit the statutes were enacted. 24 7 In so doing, the
Court was relying on cases in which it was determining whether to
imply a private cause of action where a federal statute expressly au-
thorized only a governmental claim; in such cases the Court has
looked at whether the claimant is a member of a class for whose bene-
fit the statute was enacted.248 How important that factor-or any sin-
gle factor-remains today with respect to implying private causes of
action is not free from doubt; later Court opinions have made clear
that Congressional intent is the lodestar for implying private rights of
action. 24 9 But in a broad sense, a defendant in a section 7003 case
247. "It cannot possibly be said that employers are members of the class for whose
especial benefit either the Equal Pay Act or Title VII was enacted. To the con-
trary, both statutes are expressly directed against employers; Congress intended
in these statutes to regulate their conduct for the benefit of employees." Nw.
Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 92 (1981). "The Sherman
Act and the provision for treble damages under the Clayton Act were not adopted
for the benefit of participants in a conspiracy to restrain trade. On the contrary,
petitioner is a member of the class whose activities Congress intended to regulate
for the protection and benefit of an entirely different class." Tex. Indus., Inc. v.
Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) (citation omitted).
248. Both opinions looked to Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (hold-
ing that defeated tender offeror had no private cause of action under section 14e
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934). Tex. Indus., 451 U.S. at 639; Nw.
Airlines, 451 U.S. at 92. See generally Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), in which
the Court held that no private cause of action was available based on a violation
of the Federal Election Campaign Act. Cort listed four factors as relevant for
determining whether to imply a private remedy where the statute did not ex-
pressly provide one: "First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial ben-
efit the statute was enacted-that is, does the statute create a federal right in
favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for
the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inap-
propriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?" Id. at 78 (cita-
tions omitted).
249. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), in which the Court held
that there was no private action for damages based on a violation of § 17(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Court made clear that legislative intent is
the key factor in determining whether to imply a private right of action and that
the other Cort factors are entitled to lesser weight or are merely indicia of Con-
gressional intent. Id. at 575-76; see also Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174,
179 (1988) (observing that the Court has used other tools of statutory construc-
tion, along with the Cort factors, to discern whether Congress intended to imply a
private cause of action); Id. at 189-90 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that the
Cort analysis has been "effectively overruled," because Touche Ross made Con-
gressional intent the "determinative factor," and the other three factors are sim-
ply indicia).
The Court's recent decisions reflect an increased reluctance to recognize pri-
vate rights of action not expressly provided for in federal statutes. 19 WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 240, § 4516; see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (hold-
ing that no private cause of action exists to enforce Title VI of Civil Rights Act of
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arguably is within the class that Congress intended to be benefited by
RCRA's imminent hazard provisions. Section 7002(a) expressly allows
"any person" to sue another for contributing to the presence of endan-
gering waste at a site,2 50 which has been interpreted to allow even
persons responsible for contributing to the endangerment to maintain
a section 7002(a)(1)(B) action.
25 1
More fundamentally, though, inquiring whether the claimant is a
member of a class for whose benefit the statute was enacted seems
particularly ill-suited for evaluating whether a contribution remedy
should be implied. Mechanical application of this factor in the narrow
sense would always weigh against implying a contribution right, since
by definition the party seeking contribution is one who is liable under
the statute, so it may be difficult to say that the statute was enacted
for the benefit of the class of which defendant is a member.
2 52
To the extent this factor has continued relevance in divining Con-
gressional intent to imply a contribution remedy, it should be revised
in light of the roots and purpose of contribution, as well as the fact
that the party seeking contribution necessarily must be a liable party
under the statute. Specifically, where the purpose of the federal stat-
ute is not to punish intentional bad acts but rather is remedial, courts
should be more willing to imply the remedy of contribution. 25 3 A
greater willingness to imply contribution in favor of defendants whose
liability does not stem from intentional bad acts is consistent with the
history and purpose of contribution in equity and at common law.
That is, contribution originally was an equitable doctrine, and equity
1964's disparate impact regulations). Query whether the Court should be simi-
larly reluctant to recognize a remedy for contribution?
250. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2000).
251. See, e.g., PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998) (al-
lowing current owner who contributed to contamination to maintain action); Or-
ganic Chem. Site PRP Group v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 660 (W.D.
Mich. 1998) (allowing PRP group to maintain action); Bayless Inv. & Trading Co.
v. Chevron USA, 1994 WL 1841850 (D. Ariz. May 25, 1994) (allowing owner of
leaking tanks to maintain action).
252. The Court criticized the D.C. Circuit for rejecting and mis-applying this factor in
Northwest Airlines. 451 U.S. at 92 n.25. But, as discussed below, a strict applica-
tion of this factor should have no weight in evaluating whether to imply a contri-
bution claim in favor of a defendant found strictly liable for a remedial statute
such as RCRA section 7003. See Chemung Canal Trust Co. v. Sovran Bank, 939
F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding the first Cort factor too simplistic for determin-
ing whether to imply contribution claim for fiduciary under ERISA).
253. See Flint & Moore, supra note 147, at 13-14 (noting that courts are more likely to
imply contribution right for defendant where liability under federal statute is
based on negligence rather than intentional tort); Mark J. Loewenstein, Implied
Contribution Under the Federal Securities Laws: A Reassessment, 1982 DuKE L.J.
543, 558 (1982) (arguing that it is more unfair to deny contribution to negligent
defendant than one engaged in intentional wrongdoing).
2008]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
does not favor persons with unclean hands.254 At common law, histor-
ically and today, contribution was and is not available to an inten-
tional tortfeasor.2 55 Rather than framing the inquiry as to whether
the defendant is a member of a class the statute intended to benefit,
more properly the inquiry should be whether the defendant is an in-
tentional wrongdoer that the statute aims to punish for violations of
its provisions. If so, implied contribution should be disfavored; if not,
contribution should be more readily implied. So framed, this factor
unquestionably augurs in favor of contribution for a defendant sued
under RCRA section 7003.
Recall that the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, Sherman Act and Clayton
Act all regulate intentional unlawful conduct and target specific cate-
gories of wrong-doers: discriminating employers and conspirators in
restraint of trade. These statutes provide for penalties and prison
terms based on violations of their terms.25 6 The parties asserting con-
tribution claims in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries were
clearly the culpable targets those statutes intended to regulate; it was
easy for the Court to conclude that such intentional violators of the
statutes were not among the class of intended beneficiaries under the
statutes and that such violators should not be allowed to off-load some
of their sanctions upon others.
By contrast, RCRA section 7003, like CERCLA, is a retroactive,
strict liability statute intended to be remedial rather than punitive.
Liability under RCRA section 7003 does not depend upon the defen-
dant violating any statutory or regulatory prohibition; there are no
penalties, prison terms or damages associated with acts or omissions
that give rise to liability under section 7003.257 Defendants in section
7003 cases need not be culpable at all. Liability under section 7003
may be triggered simply by having contributed to the presence of solid
waste at a site; the defendant may have used utmost care and state-of-
the-art practices and yet still be liable. 258 Accordingly, courts should
254. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A cmt. c (1979); 30A C.J.S. Equity
§ 109 (2007).
255. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A cmts. a, j (1979).
256. See supra notes 242-243.
257. RCRA § 7003(b) provides for a penalty of up to $5000 per day for failure to comply
with an order issued pursuant to section 7003(a). 42 U.S.C. § 6973(b) (2000). But
it is not a "violation" to have contributed to the presence of waste which may
present an endangerment, and being liable under section 7003 does not result in
any penalties, unless the defendant fails to comply with an order once he is found
liable. See United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 1984).
258. See Waste Indus., 734 F.2d at 164 (holding that "Section 7003, unlike the provi-
sions of the Act's subtitle C, does not regulate conduct but regulates and miti-
gates endangerment."); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp.
162, 198 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (finding that persons contributing to the endangerment
are subject to liability under RCRA section 7003 "regardless of fault or
negligence").
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be inclined to imply a remedy of contribution for defendants in RCRA
section 7003 cases.
25 9
The Valentine court relied on another Supreme Court case, Musick,
Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau,2 60 to support its hold-
ing that a contribution right should be recognized for defendants in a
section 7003 case. The Court in Musick held that a defendant in a
private action for damages pursuant to Rule 10b-5 impliedly has a
right to contribution. Unlike the statutes in Northwest Airlines and
Texas Industries, Rule 10b-5 did not expressly provide for a private
cause of action, but rather courts had judicially implied a private
cause of action, based on the express governmental claim under Rule
10b-5. The Musick Court reasoned that it would be unfair to imply a
claim against a defendant and then refuse to imply a contribution
claim for defendant.
26 1
While not directly on point, Musick is instructive for how it framed
the question of Congressional intent. Rather than looking for evi-
dence that Congress intended to provide a contribution right, as the
Court did in Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries, the Musick
Court viewed that quest as futile where Congress had not even pro-
vided for the underlying cause of action against the defendant. In-
stead, the Court saw its role as trying to discern whether Congress
would have included a contribution right if it had expressly provided
for a private cause of action under Rule 10b-5. As a result, the Court
did not require as much evidence of Congressional intent in order to
imply a contribution right in a private cause of action under Rule 10b-
5 as the Court had required with respect to the statutes at issue in
Northwest Airlines and Texas Industries. 2 62
It is important to recognize that joint and several liability is not
expressly provided for in section 7003 or its legislative history, so it is
not surprising that there is no mention of contribution in the statute
or legislative history either. Rather, joint and several liability has
been judicially implied in RCRA section 7003 cases. 26 3 Accordingly,
the relevant inquiry regarding Congressional intent should not be
whether there is evidence of Congressional intent to provide for contri-
bution in a section 7003 case; rather, the proper question is if Con-
259. On the other hand, contribution should be disfavored for a defendant in a RCRA
§ 3008 enforcement action. Section 3008 provides for civil penalties and criminal
sanction and is designed to punish those who violate RCRA's hazardous waste
management requirements. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (2000).
260. 508 U.S. 286 (1993).
261. Id. at 292.
262. Id. at 294.
263. See, e.g., United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 1361, 1401 (D.N.H.
1985) (holding that defendant must show reasonable basis for apportioning harm
to avoid joint and several liability); Conservation Chem., 619 F. Supp. at 199
(holding that liability is joint and several where endangerment is indivisible).
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gress had expressly provided for joint and several liability in RCRA
section 7003, would Congress also have provided for a right of contri-
bution. Using this more lenient standard, there should be no doubt
that the requisite intent can be shown.
4. CERCLA Supports Contribution Under RCRA
CERCLA, unlike RCRA, contains an express contribution section.
CERCLA section 113(f) grants liable parties the right to seek contri-
bution against other parties who are liable under section 107, either
during or following a civil action under sections 106 or 107, or follow-
ing resolution of CERCLA liability to the federal or state government
via an administrative or judicially approved settlement.264 Some
courts have zeroed in on the lack of a comparable express contribution
section in RCRA as showing that Congress did not intend to allow con-
tribution claims under RCRA's imminent hazard provisions. 26 5
That RCRA lacks such an express contribution provision does not
show that Congress did not intend to allow contribution claims under
RCRA or that courts should not imply a contribution claim or fashion
one under federal common law. First, the notion that Congress knew
how to provide for contribution because it did so in CERCLA, and
hence Congress must have affirmatively decided that it did not want
defendants in RCRA imminent hazard cases to have a contribution
remedy, is an example of a dubious statutory interpretation arising
from what Professor William Buzbee has termed the "one-Congress
fiction."2 66 That is, the terms of statute A should not be compared to
264. CERCLA section 113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000), provides:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following
any civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a)
of this title. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this section
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Fed-
eral law. In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate re-
sponse costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the
court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this subsection shall di-
minish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the
absence of a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of
this title.
Section 113(f)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2000), provides:
A person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State for
some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such
action in an administrative or judicially approved settlement may seek
contribution from any person who is not party to a settlement referred to
in paragraph (2).
265. See Davenport v. Neely, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1229 (M.D. Ala. 1998); United States
v. Prod. Plated Plastics, Inc., 32 ERC 1737, 1740 n.5 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
266. William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 171 (2000) (advocating that interpreters of statutes should rely on the
language, structure, and historical context of each statute rather than comparing
the terms of two different statutes enacted years apart).
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the terms of statute B as if they were written by the same drafter as a
single law; such a comparison ignores the reality that the two statutes
were enacted at different times, by different Congresses, under differ-
ent circumstances. Inter-statutory comparisons of language are par-
ticularly suspect where, as here, the statute being interpreted (RCRA)
was enacted before the statute to which it is being compared (CER-
CLA), and where the interpretation rests upon the absence of lan-
guage in the statute being interpreted. 26 7
Second, courts in CERCLA cases found a right to contribution even
before Congress added an express contribution provision to the statute
in 1986. CERCLA as originally enacted in 1980 had no express lan-
guage providing for contribution; section 113(f) was added by the 1986
amendments. 268 Prior to the time CERCLA was expressly amended
to provide for contribution among responsible parties, courts repeat-
edly held that a liable party had a right of contribution, either im-
pliedly or under federal common law.269 In 1986, Congress expressly
added section 113(f) to eliminate any question regarding the existence
of a right to contribution under CERCLA and to confirm its availabil-
ity.2 70 The legislative history shows that Congress believed contribu-
tion to be important because it would promote settlement, decrease
litigation and facilitate cleanups. Congress recognized that responsi-
ble parties would be more willing to settle and perform the cleanup
themselves where they were assured they could seek contribution
against other responsible parties. 27 1
267. Id. at 240-42. RCRA was enacted in 1976, whereas CERCLA was enacted in
1980. Resource Conversation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90
Stat. 2795 (1976); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980). Section 113(f) was
not added to CERCLA until 1986, after RCRA section 7003 was amended and
section 7002(a)(1)(B) was added in 1984. Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986); Hazard-
ous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221
(1984). It also should be noted that both CERCLA and RCRA were hastily, and
many say poorly, drafted in the final days of congressional sessions. See, e.g.,
HysON, supra note 65, at xii (noting that CERCLA was drafted in a rush by the
Carter administration); William L. Kovacs & John F. Klucsik, The New Federal
Role in Solid Waste Management: The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976, 3 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 216-20 (1976) (detailing passage of RCRA);
United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 165 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting
hastiness of RCRA's passage).
268. 100 Stat. 1613, 1647-48.
269. See supra note 156.
270. 100 Stat. 1613, 1647-48; H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at 79 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861-62.
271. H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at 59, 79-80 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2835, 2841, 2862 (1986). The legislative history also noted that the availability of
contribution would promote efficiency by allowing all liability and allocation
claims to be decided in one case, and would lessen "ill will" to the government by
original defendants. Id. at 80, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2862.
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Third, as illustrated by Atlantic Research, even after an express
contribution section was added to CERCLA, courts have continued to
allow claims in the nature of contribution even where the responsible
party could not take advantage of section 113(f) under the express
terms of the statute. Because the Supreme Court in Atlantic Research
based its decision to allow a responsible party to sue under section 107
upon the express terms of the statute, the Court did not reach the
alternative holding of the Eighth Circuit: an implied right of contribu-
tion exists under CERCLA for responsible parties who are not eligible
for contribution in the post-Aviall world under the terms of section
113(f).272 Finding that "[clontribution is crucial to CERCLA's regula-
tory scheme," 273 the Eighth Circuit in Atlantic Research implied a
right to contribution for responsible parties under CERCLA who can-
not maintain an action for contribution under section 113(f) because
they cleaned up the site voluntarily without first being sued under
sections 106 or 107 or formally settling with the government. The
Eighth Circuit recited the same test as the Supreme Court had used in
Northwest Airlines: the ultimate question is Congress' intent, which
can be discerned by looking at the statute's language, its legislative
history, its underlying purpose and structure, and the likelihood that
Congress intended to supercede or supplement existing state reme-
dies.27 4 The Eighth Circuit did not specifically address whether re-
sponsible parties under CERCLA were in the class whose members
especially benefited from CERCLA. Instead, the Eighth Circuit found
that CERCLA's language and legislative history demonstrate an in-
tent to provide for contribution, that Congress did not intend to pre-
clude other rights to contribution under the statute when it enacted
section 113(f), and that barring contribution to responsible parties
who voluntarily clean up contaminated sites is contrary to CERCLA's
purpose of encouraging private cleanups of contaminated sites and
preserving the public treasury. 27 5 The Eighth Circuit concluded that
nothing in the terms of CERCLA or otherwise suggested that Con-
gress intended to penalize parties who "voluntarily" engaged in clean-
ups by foreclosing contribution to them, while rewarding responsible
272. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2339 n.8 (2007). Such use
of the term "contribution" is not completely accurate in the traditional common
law sense, inter alia, because the contribution-plaintiff has not been found liable,
been sued by, or paid money to another party. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 886A(1) cmt. e (1979). The focus of this Article is on claims by defend-
ants in RCRA imminent hazard cases; this Article is not using the term "contri-
bution" to include section 7002(a)(1)(B) claims by responsible parties who
"voluntarily" incur cleanup costs because they might be sued under RCRA's im-
minent hazard provisions.
273. Atl. Research, 459 F.3d at 836.
274. Id. (citing Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981)).
275. Id.
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parties who are sued under CERCLA sections 106 or 107 by allowing
them contribution expressly under section 113(f)(1). 276
Similarly, nothing in the terms or purpose of RCRA suggests that
Congress intended to foreclose contribution to responsible parties who
are sued under section 7003 while allowing contribution for those sued
under CERCLA, nor to require a responsible party sued under section
7003 to bear the entire cost of cleaning up a site while other responsi-
ble parties who contributed to the endangerment escape responsibility
for any such costs. Requiring one such strictly liable party, among
many contributors to the endangerment, to carry the entire burden of
cleanup, without any right of recourse against other responsible par-
ties, does not further RCRA's goals. Indeed, it would be counter-pro-
ductive and contrary to the statute's purpose to force only certain
responsible parties to bear the entire cleanup costs-such as those
who agree to settle with the government and perform the necessary
work-and allow the other responsible parties to sit back and evade
all liability.27 7
Thus, simply because RCRA lacks an express contribution provi-
sion such as CERCLA should not preclude a finding of a right to con-
tribution under RCRA section 7003. Not only is such a comparison an
example of the flawed "one-Congress fiction" approach to statutory in-
terpretation, the right to contribution under CERCLA does not even
depend upon that statute's express contribution section; an action for
276. Id. at 837; see also Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. v. N. Am. Galvanizing &
Coatings, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Ill. 2005), affd, 473 F.3d 824 (7th Cir.
2007) (holding that a responsible party which voluntarily cleaned up contami-
nated site had implied right of contribution under CERCLA section 107).
277. See United States v. Valentine, 856 F. Supp. 627, 634-35 (D. Wyo. 1994); Hazard-
ous Waste, supra note 229, at 510-11 (arguing that contribution under RCRA
§ 7003 would speed cleanups by spreading liability); cf. Colo. v. ASARCO, Inc.,
608 F. Supp. 1484, 1491 (D. Colo. 1985) (noting that once cleanup is assured, no
CERCLA statutory goal would be promoted by forcing only some of the responsi-
ble parties to bear all the cleanup costs).
It could be argued that recognizing contribution claims under RCRA would
increase litigation and delay cleanups, pointing to the CERCLA experience. Sta-
tistics indicate that as much as 33% of costs associated with Superfund sites go to
attorneys, ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 6 (Janet S. Kole & Stephanie Nye eds., 2d
ed. 1999), and lengthy cleanups are not unusual at CERCLA sites. The high legal
costs and remediation delays of the Superfund program, however, should not be
reasons to bar the availability of contribution claims under RCRA. One, contri-
bution litigation is far from the only cause of CERCLA's high transactional costs
and cleanup delays. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 62, at 434-37. Two, effec-
tive case management in RCRA imminent hazard cases could allow the govern-
ment's case to proceed against the original defendants, with cross-claims and
third-party complaints for contribution stayed until a judgment or settlement is
reached with the original defendants, whereupon the cleanup could proceed while
contribution claims are litigated. Three, although calls for Superfund reform are
common, noticeably absent are calls to eliminate contribution claims for responsi-
ble parties while maintaining joint and several liability. See id.
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contribution has been implied by courts under CERCLA where there
was no express right to contribution, both before and after section
113(f) was added to CERCLA.
Rather, the importance of allocating costs among responsible par-
ties under CERCLA, as evidenced by Atlantic Research, makes it even
more appropriate to imply a contribution claim under its sibling site
cleanup authority, RCRA section 7003. Section 7003 and CERCLA
share a similar purpose-to make responsible parties clean up (or pay
for the cleanup of) contaminated sites. Both statutes use similar
strict, retroactive, expansive liability schemes to achieve that common
goal; the same contaminated site often may give rise to suits against
the same defendants under either RCRA section 7003 or CERCLA or
both. Joint and several liability is not expressly required by either
statute, yet courts have implied joint and several liability under both.
Contribution in CERCLA cases is common and has been widely recog-
nized as crucial to realizing CERCLA's purpose. Congress and courts
recognize that a right to contribution not only promotes fairness but
also encourages settlements and results in a decrease in the amount of
funds expended by the government in cleanup and litigation. 278 The
same reasoning applies to RCRA, and therefore a contribution claim
should be available in section 7003 cases. 27 9 It makes no sense for the
right of contribution to depend upon which alternative site cleanup
authority the plaintiff chooses to employ.
B. Section 7002(a)(1)(B)
As discussed in Part II.B above, section 7002(a)(1)(B) is patterned
after section 7003. The language is virtually identical, the responsible
parties and elements of liability are the same, and courts largely have
interpreted the two sections co-extensively. Accordingly, for the same
reasons set forth in Part V.A of this Article, a defendant in a citizen
suit under section 7002(a)(1)(B) arguably should have the same right
to contribution as a defendant in a section 7003 action, impliedly
under the statute or by virtue of federal common law.
But unlike section 7003, section 7002(a)(1)(B) authorizes an ex-
press cause of action to parties other than the United States. This
part of the Article demonstrates that a defendant in a section
7002(a)(1)(B) citizen suit should be able to maintain a claim, in the
nature of contribution, against other responsible parties under the ex-
press terms of section 7002(a)(1)(B). The Supreme Court's decision in
278. See, e.g., United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1268-69 (D.
Del. 1986) (noting that the right to contribution in CERCLA "encourages expedi-
tious settlement" and "protects Superfund's financial resources from depletion.");
H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at 59, 80 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835,
2841, 2862.
279. See Valentine, 856 F. Supp. at 636.
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Meghrig should not be viewed as foreclosing such a remedy, particu-
larly in light of the Court's most recent CERCLA cost allocation
opinion.
1. Statute Expressly Provides for Citizen Suit in Nature of
Contribution
Section 7002(a) expressly provides that "any person" may com-
mence a civil action against anyone who has contributed or is contrib-
uting to the presence of solid or hazardous waste which may present
an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environ-
ment.28 0 Noting that the statute says "any person" may commence a
citizen suit under section 7002(a)(1)(B), courts consistently have al-
lowed parties who themselves could be liable for the endangerment to
maintain actions under section 7002(a)(1)(B) against others. 2 8 1 Since
"any person" can include a responsible party, a defendant in a section
7002(a)(1)(B) action likewise should be able to assert a section
7002(a)(1)(B) claim against another person who has contributed or is
contributing to the endangerment-as a third-party complaint, a
cross-claim or a counterclaim. The plain language of the statute per-
mits such a claim.
2 82
A potentially more difficult question is whether section
7002(a)(1)(B) authorizes relief that would force another responsible
party to share the costs for work the defendant may be ordered to per-
form in a section 7002(a)(1)(B) citizen suit. The court in a section
7002(a)(1)(B) suit has jurisdiction "to restrain" any person who has
contributed or is contributing to the presence of such solid or hazard-
ous waste, and "to order such person to take such other action as may
280. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a), (a)(1)(B) (2000).
281. See, e.g., PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 1998) (al-
lowing current owner who contributed to contamination to maintain action); Or-
ganic Chem. Site PRP Group v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 660 (W.D.
Mich. 1998) (allowing PRP group to maintain action); Bayless Inv. & Trading Co.
v. Chevron USA, No. 93C704, 1994 WL 1841850 (D. Ariz. May 25, 1994) (allowing
owner of leaking tanks to maintain action); see also Sealy Conn., Inc. v. Litton
Indus., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 120, 125, n.5 (D. Conn. 1997) (allowing owner to main-
tain section 7002(a)(1)(B) citizen suit although not without expressing its
concern).
282. Standing normally should be easy to demonstrate: The defendant is threatened
with economic injury as a result of its potential liability for the contamination,
causation exists where there is evidence linking the other parties to the contami-
nation, and the court can redress the injury by awarding relief in favor of the
defendant. See also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (recognizing that economic injury may constitute in-
jury in fact); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 737 (1972) (recognizing eco-
nomic injury may constitute injury in fact); cf 110 W., LLC v. Red Spot Paint &
Varnish Co., No. l:05-cv-1670-LJM-WTL, 2007 WL 3036876, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Oct.
15, 2007) (holding that plaintiff had standing in light of economic injury posed by
its contaminated site).
20081 475
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be necessary." 283 Courts consistently have found that Congress in-
tended to afford claimants under section 7002(a)(1)(B) with broad in-
junctive relief, both prohibitory and mandatory, in order to clean up
sites contaminated with solid or hazardous wastes. 28 4 Hence, a defen-
dant should be able to assert a claim for injunctive relief against an-
other responsible party under section 7002(a)(1)(B) seeking, for
example, an order requiring that the other responsible party take af-
firmative action to clean up the wastes.
But how does a court order such affirmative relief when a plaintiff
seeks and obtains an injunction to abate the endangerment against an
original defendant, and the original defendant seeks and obtains an
injunction to abate the same endangerment against a third-party de-
fendant? It appears well settled that the original defendant will be
jointly and severally liable to the innocent plaintiff, and thus the court
should order the original defendant to perform all the work necessary
to abate the endangerment (unless the original defendant can estab-
lish divisibility).28 5 But should the original defendant get the benefit
of a similar order requiring the third-party defendant to perform all
the work, where both the original and third-party defendants are re-
sponsible parties? If so, the third-party defendant may ultimately
have to do all the work and pay all the costs to abate the endanger-
ment, while the original defendant escapes without having to do or
pay anything toward such abatement.
Similarly, where multiple original defendants are sued under sec-
tion 7002(a)(1)(B), a court may order the defendants, as jointly and
severally liable, to perform the work to abate the endangerment. 28 6
But again, if one or both defendants assert a section 7002(a)(1)(B)
claim for injunctive relief against the other, how does the court coordi-
nate its award of relief for the plaintiff against the defendants with an
order or orders in favor of each of the defendants inter se?
A court, consistent with its equitable powers, could issue an affirm-
ative injunction in favor of the innocent plaintiff that would require
the liable defendant(s) to perform the entire work to abate the endan-
283. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a).
284. See Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 484 (1996); City of Bangor v. Citizens
Commc'n Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 180, 218 (D. Me. 2006).
285. See, e.g., Me. People's Alliance v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 298 (1st Cir.
2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 93 (2007) (holding that defendant is responsible for
totality of damage unless harm is divisible); United States v. Conservation Chem.
Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 199 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (holding that liability is joint and
several where endangerment is indivisible); United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc.,
630 F. Supp. 1361 (D.N.H. 1985) (holding that defendant must show reasonable
basis for apportioning harm to avoid joint and several liability).
286. See, e.g., Lincoln Props., Ltd. v. Higgins, No. S-91-76ODFLIGGH, 1993 WL
217429, at *16 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (requiring defendants to monitor and investigate
groundwater for certain pollutant).
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germent, and then try to craft another order or orders that would re-
quire each liable defendant to do some lesser portion of the entire
work.28 7 However, there may be legal and practical difficulties for a
court trying to craft such affirmative injunctions against a third-party
defendant or co-defendant in favor of an original defendant. First, it
may be hard for a court to determine with any precision what work
equates with each liable party's equitable share. For example, the
court may believe that the third-party defendant should bear a 2/3
share versus the original defendant's 1/3 share, but it may be difficult
for a court to ascertain what subset of the necessary cleanup work
equates to a 1/3 or 2/3 share. Second, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65(d) mandates that every order granting an injunction "shall be spe-
cific in terms" and "shall describe in reasonable detail" the acts that
the party must do or not do.288 Thus, it may be difficult for a court to
specify what each liable party must do, while assuring that the multi-
ple injunctions comprehensively abate the endangerment and that the
citizen suit plaintiffs entitlement to joint and several liability against
the defendant(s) is not compromised. 28 9 Third, requiring multiple re-
sponsible parties to perform parts of a cleanup could pose substantial
problems in coordinating and completing the work efficiently and
safely.
A preferable solution, therefore, legally and practically, would be
for the court to order the original defendant (D1) to perform the work
required to abate the endangerment, and order the third-party defen-
dant or co-defendant (D2), not to perform a share of the work, but
rather to pay money to D1 to fund D2's fair share of the work. In such
circumstances, a remedy of a cash contribution to D1 from D2 is the
effective equivalent of an award of affirmative injunctive relief in
favor of D1 against D2.
As the Third Circuit made clear in construing identical remedy-
authorizing language under section 7003-in language quoted approv-
ingly in the legislative history for the 1984 amendments-Congress
sought to invoke broad and flexible equity powers, including an order
287. Cf. United States v. Valentine, 856 F. Supp. 627, 634 n.7 (D. Wyo. 1994) (holding
that the court has authority to order jointly and severally liable defendants to
fund the cleanup and to apportion responsibility); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 886A (1979) (providing for contribution among defendants to the extent
one has paid more than its equitable share of the common liability).
288. This requirement applies to permanent as well as preliminary injunctions. See,
e.g., Reich v. ABC/York-Estes Corp., 64 F.3d 316, 319-20 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding
that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were violated when order was not specific
enough in its terms and did not reasonably describe acts to be restrained);
STEVEN BAICKER-McKEE ET AL., FEDERAL CIVIL RULES HANDBOOK 1019 (2006).
289. See Bangor, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 219 (ordering both liable parties to perform the
cleanup jointly and severally, because of concerns that splitting the work between
the two parties might not result in attaining the goal of abating the
endangerment).
2008]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
that requires a liable party to pay money to fund investigative and
remedial work.2 90 Requiring one liable party to fund a share of the
work, in lieu of performing a portion of the work itself, should be well
within the scope of the court's equitable powers under section
7002(a)(1)(B).
2 9 1
Congress also intended that section 7003, and concomitantly sec-
tion 7002(a)(1)(B), be a codification and expansion of common law pub-
lic nuisance remedies. 29 2 Contribution clearly is-and was at the
time sections 7003 and 7002(a)(1)(B) were enacted-an important
component of the remedies of common law public nuisance.29 3 There-
fore, it is consistent with the express language of section 7002(a)(1)(B)
and the intent of Congress for a remedy in the nature of contribution
to be available to defendants under section 7002(a)(1)(B).
2. Meghrig Is Not a Bar to Contribution, Particularly When
Viewed Through the Prism of Atlantic Research
The Supreme Court's decision in Meghrig does not preclude recog-
nition of a right to such contribution-type relief under the express
terms of section 7002(a)(1)(B). The citizen suit plaintiff in Meghrig
had completed cleanup of the oil contaminated site and sought recov-
ery of costs it already had incurred prior to initiating suit. There was
no longer any imminent and substantial endangerment. 29 4 The
Court's holdings were that the terms of section 7002(a) do not contem-
plate the award of past cleanup costs incurred pre-complaint, and that
section 7002(a)(1)(B) permits a citizen to bring suit only upon an alle-
gation that the contaminated site presently poses an imminent and
substantial endangerment, not merely that it posed an endangerment
some time in the past.
2 9 5
From a timing perspective, Meghrig makes plain that a section
7002(a)(1)(B) claim cannot be brought if there is no longer an immi-
nent and substantial endangerment. 296 But if a defendant were to as-
sert a section 7002(a)(1)(B) claim in a third-party complaint (or cross-
claim or counterclaim) while there was still an endangerment, neither
the terms of the statute nor the teachings of Meghrig would bar such a
claim.
290. United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 211-14 (3d Cir. 1982).
291. See United States v. Torlaw Realty, Inc., 483 F. Supp. 2d 967 (C.D. Cal. 2007)
(ordering defendants to pay money to fund government's future cleanup work,
pursuant to RCRA § 7003); Nashua Corp. v. Norton Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 330
(N.D.N.Y. 2000) (requiring defendant to pay 90% of plaintiffs future cleanup cost
bills, pursuant to RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B)).
292. S. REP. No. 96-172, at 5 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019, 5023.
293. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1979); PROSSER, supra note 149, § 50,
294. Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1996).
295. Id. at 484-88.
296. Id. at 484.
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With respect to relief available under section 7002(a)(1)(B), all of
the Meghrig Court's language regarding available relief is directed at
explaining why a private party cannot voluntarily undertake a
cleanup and then file suit under section 7002(a)(1)(B) to recover those
past costs incurred prior to bringing suit. It is in this context that the
Meghrig Court compared section 7002(a)(1)(B) to CERCLA sections
107 and 113(f)(1) and concluded that Congress did not intend the lan-
guage of RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) to provide for recovery of past
cleanup costs. 29 7 However, contrary to the conclusions drawn by cer-
tain later courts, 298 Meghrig does not preclude all awards of monetary
relief. The Meghrig opinion certainly did not so hold. Indeed, the
Court specifically did not decide "whether a private party could seek to
obtain an injunction requiring another party to pay cleanup costs
which arise after an RCRA citizen suit has been properly com-
menced ... or otherwise recover cleanup costs paid out after the invo-
cation of RCRA's statutory process."29 9 Further, neither the language
nor logic of Meghrig should foreclose all remedies that would require a
liable party to pay for future cleanup costs. Orders requiring liable
parties to perform work that will cost them money in the future are
common under section 7002(a)(1)(B).300 Nor should Meghrig be con-
strued to prevent a court from ordering a responsible party to pay an-
other responsible party for performing such future work. As discussed
in preceding Part V.B.1, an order requiring a liable party D2 to pay
cash to fund a portion of the work the liable party D1 has been ordered
to conduct is the functional equivalent, and superior practical alterna-
297. The Court expressly stated that it was not deciding whether section 7002(a)(1)(B)
could be used to require a responsible party to reimburse a plaintiff for past
cleanup costs incurred post-complaint. Id. at 488. The Court's reference to sec-
tion 113(f)(1) in this context should not be viewed as an indication that the Court
would look askance at a contribution claim under RCRA due to the absence of an
express contribution section. At the time Meghrig was decided in 1996, CERCLA
case law was fairly well settled that a responsible party could maintain an action
for cost recovery only pursuant to section 113(f), not section 107. Even cost recov-
ery actions by responsible party plaintiffs which had never been sued under CER-
CLA and had "voluntarily" incurred their response costs were often termed
"contribution" actions and maintained pursuant to section 113(f). See, e.g., Azko
Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner, Inc., 30 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1994); United Techs. Corp. v.
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Colo. &
E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530 (10th Cir. 1995). As the Court later explained in
Meghrig, "the cost recovery provisions of CERCLA, amply demonstrate that Con-
gress did not intend for a private citizen to be able to undertake a cleanup and
then proceed to recover its costs under RCRA." 516 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added).
298. See Avondale Fed. Sav. Bank v. Amoco Oil Co., 170 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 1999);
United States v. Apex Oil Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 948 (S.D. Ill. 2006); Andritz
Sprout-Bauer, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 609 (M.D. Pa. 1997).
299. 516 U.S. at 488.
300. See, e.g., Me. People's Alliance v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277 (1st Cir. 2006);
Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, 399 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
545 U.S. 1129 (2005).
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tive, to requiring both D1 and D2 to perform distinct portions of the
required work.
The Supreme Court's decision in Atlantic Research further in-
structs that section 7002(a)(1)(B) should be interpreted in a manner
that provides for a remedy in the nature of contribution. First, the
Court made clear that there are differences between claims for cost
recovery and contribution under CERCLA. Cost recovery claims
under CERCLA section 107 are for parties who voluntarily incur
cleanup costs and seek to recover them from responsible parties. Con-
tribution claims under section 113(f), by contrast, are for defendants
which have been sued under CERCLA sections 106 or 107 or have re-
solved their CERCLA liability to the government in an administrative
or judicially approved settlement.3o1 As the Court emphasized, a
claim for cost recovery may be available where no claim for contribu-
tion is allowed, and a claim for contribution may be available where
there is no claim for cost recovery. 30 2 Similarly, a difference can be
recognized between cost recovery and contribution under RCRA sec-
tion 7002(a)(1)(B). That is, although RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) in
Meghrig was construed to preclude a plaintiff from recovering past
costs voluntarily incurred, it does not mean that section 7002(a)(1)(B)
cannot be interpreted to allow for a remedy in the nature of contribu-
tion toward future cleanup work by a defendant who has been sued
under section 7002(a)(1)(B).
Second, the Atlantic Research Court made clear that the statutory
language should be interpreted in a manner consistent with its "plain
meaning" to allow a responsible party to allocate responsibility for
cleanup costs to other responsible parties, rather than in a strained
manner that would preclude responsible parties from cost allocation
and perhaps force one responsible party to bear all of the costs itself.
The United States had argued that only innocent parties should be
permitted to maintain an action for cost recovery under CERCLA sec-
tion 107, but the Court found that the plain language of the statute
permitted "any person" to maintain an action under section 107-even
responsible parties.30 3 Similarly, the expansive language of RCRA
section 7002(a)(1)(B), including "to take such other action as may be
necessary," should not be construed in a pinched fashion to deny a
defendant the ability to seek contribution from other responsible
parties.
301. "We have previously recognized that 107(a) and 113(f) provide two 'clearly dis-
tinct' remedies." United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2337-38
(2007) (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 163 n.3
(2004)).
302. AtI. Research, 127 S. Ct. at 2337-38, 2338 n.6.
303. Id. at 2335-36.
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Third, Atlantic Research reflects the importance of permitting re-
sponsible parties a claim by which they can share the cleanup cost
burden with other responsible parties. Even in circumstances where
it was unclear whether the express terms of CERCLA sections 107 or
113(f) would provide a responsible party with a claim to allocate costs
among other responsible parties, the Atlantic Research Court declared
that the responsible party would have a cost allocation remedy under
CERCLA. Specifically, the Court made clear that a defendant which
was compelled to incur future cleanup costs in the aftermath of a suit
under CERCLA sections 106 or 107-a scenario that did not fall
neatly into the Court's descriptions of section 113(f) contribution and
section 107 cost recovery claims-would be able to obtain relief
against other responsible parties "under section 113(f), sectionl07(a),
or both."304 Similarly, courts should not interpret RCRA section
7002(a)(1)(B) in a manner that would deny a defendant the right to
maintain an action in the nature of contribution to force other respon-
sible parties to share in the cost of the future cleanup the defendant
has been compelled to conduct. Rather, section 7002(a)(1)(B) should
be interpreted in a manner, consistent with its language and purpose,
that allows a defendant to obtain contribution for a share of those fu-
ture cleanup costs from other responsible parties.
Fourth, in Atlantic Research the Court observed that a defendant
sued by a responsible party under CERCLA section 107 could assert a
contribution counterclaim under CERCLA section 113(f).30 5 It would
be absurd to allow a responsible party-plaintiff to maintain a RCRA
section 7002(a)(1)(B) claim against responsible parties, while prevent-
ing a responsible party-defendant from asserting a section
7002(a)(1)(B) claim against other responsible parties, including the
plaintiff. For example, assume P, D1 and D2 are all responsible par-
ties at a site. If P can initiate a section 7002(a)(1)(B) suit to force D1
to clean up the site, there should be no reason why D1 cannot assert a
section 7002(a)(1)(B) counterclaim against P and a third-party com-
plaint to force D2 to participate in the cleanup as well. If D1 were not
permitted to assert such section 7002(a)(1)(B) claims in the nature of
contribution, it would mean that D1 is left with the entire cleanup
burden, simply because P was faster to the courthouse and D2 was
luckier. 30 6 Congress could not have intended that allocation of re-
304. Id. at 2338 n.6.
305. Id. at 2339. In so doing, the Court assumed, without deciding, that the responsi-
ble party-plaintiff would be entitled to joint and several liability under CERCLA
section 107. Id. at 2339 n.7.
306. This hypothetical assumes that the court would subject D1 to joint and several
liability in favor of P. If D's liability were merely several under RCRA section
7002(a)(1)(B), there would likely be no need for DI to assert a counterclaim or
third-party complaint, because D1 would only be liable for its fair share of the
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sponsibility for RCRA-mandated cleanups should be decided by such
factors.
3. Section 7002(b)(2) Requirements
As discussed in Part II.B above, plaintiffs initiating a citizen suit
pursuant to section 7002(a)(1)(B) must comply with the requirements
of subsection (b)(2) of section 7002, which preclude commencement of
an action: (1) unless the plaintiff has provided ninety days advance
notice to the EPA, the state in which the endangerment may occur,
and any person alleged to have contributed to or be contributing to the
presence of the waste which may present the endangerment, 30 7 or (2)
where the EPA or the state has commenced and is diligently prosecut-
ing an action under sections 7003 or 7002(a)(1)(B) of RCRA or has
taken certain actions pursuant to CERCLA with respect to the alleged
endangerment.30
8
Although by its terms subsection (b)(2)(A) states that "[n]o action
may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section prior to
ninety days after the plaintiff has given notice of the endanger-
ment,"30 9 courts have held that the ninety-day notice requirement
also applies to cross-claims and third-party complaints as a jurisdic-
tional prerequisite. 3 1o The purpose of the section 7002(b)(2)(A) ad-
vance notice requirement is to allow the agency to assume the lead in
bringing the action and to allow the defendant to remedy the situa-
tion.311 Thus, the advance notice requirement may make sense for a
third-party complaint adding a new party to the case, or where the
cross-claim or counterclaim is the first section 7002(a)(1)(B) claim as-
serted in the case.3 12 However, where the plaintiff has filed a section
7002(a)(1)(B) citizen suit and provided the requisite advance notice, it
cleanup. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY §§ 10-11
(2000).
307. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(A) (2000).
308. Id. § 6972(b)(2)(B).
309. Id. § 6972(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
310. See Portsmouth Redevelopment & Hous. Auth. v. BMI Apartments Ass'n., 847 F.
Supp. 380 (E.D. Va. 1994) (counterclaim and cross-claim dismissed); Walker v.
TDY Holdings, LLC, 135 F. Supp. 2d 787 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (third-party complaint
dismissed); see also Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989) (holding
sixty-day notice set forth in section 7002(b)(1) jurisdictional for plaintiff asserting
citizen suit based on violations of RCRA under section 7002(a)(1)(A)).
311. See A.M. Int'l v. Datacard, 106 F.3d 1342, 1349 (7th Cir. 1994).
312. Indeed, courts which have applied the ninety-day notice requirement to a defen-
dant's pleading were faced with just such circumstances. In Portsmouth, 847 F.
Supp. 380, plaintiff initiated a CERCLA cost recovery case, and the cross-claim
and counterclaim by defendant were the initial RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B) claims in
that case. In Walker, 135 F. Supp. 2d 787, plaintiff brought a section
7002(a)(1)(B) claim, but defendant's third-party complaint under section
7002(a)(1)(B) added a new party to the case who had not received plaintiffs origi-
nal notice.
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makes little sense to require a defendant to provide ninety days ad-
vance notice for its counterclaim or cross-claim, since notice of the en-
dangerment situation already has been provided to the EPA, the
state, and all the existing parties to the case who would be subject to
the cross-claim or counterclaim. The EPA and the state already had
the chance to take action under RCRA or CERCLA during plaintiffs
ninety-day notice period, and the existing parties in the case likewise
had a chance to act during plaintiffs notice period.3 13
The restrictions of sections 7002(b)(2)(B) & (C), pertaining to EPA
and state actions, should have no relevance to a defendant's assertion
of a section 7002(a)(1)(B) claim in response to a private plaintiffs sec-
tion 7002(a)(1)(B) citizen suit, since the plaintiffs suit would be
barred in the first instance by such restrictions. 3 14 However, a defen-
dant seemingly could be precluded by section 7002(b)(2)(C) from as-
serting a section 7002(a)(1)(B) claim against another responsible party
in the context of a citizen suit brought by a state under section
7002(a)(1)(B) regarding the alleged endangerment. "No action may be
commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section if the State, in
order to restrain or abate acts or conditions which may have contrib-
uted or are contributing to the activities which may present the al-
leged endangerment-(i) has commenced and is diligently prosecuting
an action under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this section."3 15 Since the
plaintiff-state has commenced the citizen suit under section
7002(a)(1)(B), the literal terms of section 7002(b)(2)(C) would seem to
preclude a defendant from asserting a section 7002(a)(1)(B) claim in
the nature of contribution.316
313. See Zands v. Nelson, 779 F. Supp. 1254 (E.D. Cal. 1991) (requiring the plaintiff to
provide ninety days notice before amending its complaint to add a section
7002(a)(1)(B) claim, but not requiring that the ninety days must have preceded
initiation of the lawsuit).
314. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B)-(C). One of the reasons cited in Meghrig v. KFC
Western, Inc., for denying recovery of past cleanup costs under RCRA section
7002(a)(1)(B) was that if RCRA were designed to compensate private parties for
past cleanup costs, the RCRA provisions barring citizen suits unless there has
been 90 days notice and the government is not taking action would be "wholly
irrational," because they would allow recovery of costs only by private parties at
sites with waste problems that were insufficiently severe to attract the attention
of government officials, while private parties at sites with substantial problems
would be foreclosed from recovering pasts costs. 516 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1996).
Where the plaintiffs section 7002(a)(1)(B) claim is not barred by section
7002(b)(2), this reason would have no relevance to a section 7002(a)(1)(B) claim
asserted by a defendant.
315. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(C)(i). In the context of a section 7002(a)(1)(B) suit by any
party besides the state, neither subsection (b)(2)(B) nor (b)(2)(C) would prevent a
defendant from asserting a section 7002(a)(1)(B) claim against any person.
316. See United v. Prod. Plated Plastics, Inc., 32 ERC 1737, 1740-41, 1741 n.6 (W.D.
Mich. 1991) (holding that because State of Michigan was one of the plaintiffs in
this RCRA enforcement case, defendants' third-party complaint for contribution
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It is in this situation, however, where a claim for contribution
should be implied under section 7002(a)(1)(B) or recognized under fed-
eral common law. As discussed in Part V.A above, there should be an
implied or federal common law claim for contribution available in ac-
tions brought by the United States under section 7003. Since section
7002(a)(1)(B) is modeled after section 7003, and has largely been in-
terpreted co-extensively with section 7003, a defendant in a state-ini-
tiated citizen suit should have the same contribution rights as a
defendant in a United States-initiated suit. Section 7002(b) is in-
tended to prevent citizen suits from interfering with government ac-
tions to address the endangerment conditions. Allowing a defendant
to seek to have more responsible parties contribute to the costs of the
work should not so interfere. 3 17 The state's claim against the defen-
dant can be litigated independently of the defendant's contribution
claims against others, and if liable the defendant will still be obligated
to the state to perform the work, regardless of whether the defendant
may ultimately be successful in requiring other responsible parties to
share in the costs of the work.3 18
VI. FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING ISSUES LIKELY TO
ARISE DURING CONTRIBUTION CLAIMS IN RCRA
IMMINENT HAZARD CASES
As set forth in Part V above, courts should recognize a claim for
contribution by a person sued under RCRA sections 7002(a)(1)(B) or
7003. But what should this contribution claim look like? The statute
itself obviously does not offer much guidance, and no court-not even
Valentine-has tackled many issues in the context of a contribution
claim under RCRA imminent hazard provisions. 3 19 In short, consis-
against private party pursuant to RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B) was barred under the
terms of section 7002(b)(2)(C), though the court described it as a "unique situa-
tion" that "Section 7002(b)(2)(C) may not have anticipated").
317. CERCLA section 113(f)(1) expressly allows a defendant to assert a contribution
claim during a suit brought by the government or a private party pursuant to
CERCIA sections 106 or 107, and such contribution claims frequently are as-
serted before the cleanup is completed. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, 757 F.
Supp. 397 (D.N.J. 1991); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2000) (Although section
113(h) broadly bars a party from seeking judicial review of a response action se-
lected by the government under many circumstances, it does not prevent a chal-
lenge to the remedy in a cost recovery action under section 107.).
318. A defendant in a section 7003 action by the United States would be similarly
precluded from asserting a section 7002(a)(1)(B) citizen suit in an effort to force
allocation of costs among other responsible parties. But the unavailability of an
express section 7002(a)(1)(B) citizen suit claim to a defendant in a section 7003
action should be no barrier to such a defendant asserting the implied and federal
common law contribution claims discussed in Part V.A above.
319. In United States v. Valentine, the decision recognizing a right of contribution for
section 7003 defendants was rendered at the pleading stage of the case, granting
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tent with the language, roots and purpose of RCRA sections 7003 and
7002(a)(1)(B), courts dealing with such contribution claims should
look to principles of equity and common law as well as to practices
under the most analogous federal statute, CERCLA.
A. Allocation Principles
Under modern common law principles, the right to contribution
arises only where two or more persons are liable to the same plaintiff
for the same harm, and one of the liable parties has paid more than
his equitable share of the common liability.32 0 Each liable party's fair
share is determined in comparison to that of the other liable par-
ties.3 21 Exactly how the comparison is made and equitable shares are
determined is largely left to the equitable powers and discretion of the
judges. No single factor is determinative, and a wide variety of factors
may be relevant.322
When Congress added an express provision authorizing contribu-
tion in CERCLA cases, it directed that "equitable factors" would guide
allocation of cleanup cost responsibility among liable parties. Section
113(f)(1) provides: "In resolving contribution claims, the court may al-
locate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors
as the court determines are appropriate."323 Courts in CERCLA cases
have employed a plethora of different equitable factors to allocate re-
sponsibility for response costs. The so-called Gore factors frequently
leave to file a third-party complaint and cross-claim for contribution. 856 F.
Supp. 627, 629, 637 (D. Wyo. 1994). As one commenter has noted, "the equity and
efficiency of § 7003 [contribution] actions will ultimately turn substantially on
related issues that Valentine left open." Johnson, supra note 240, at 237.
320. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1979) (allowing defendant a contri-
bution right where he has paid more than his "equitable share"); Nw. Airlines,
Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 87-88 (1981) (recognizing contribu-
tion when one joint tortfeasor has paid more than its "fair share" of the common
liability); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 23
(2000) (stating that a defendant entitled to contribution can recover no more than
the amount paid to plaintiff in excess of that defendant's "comparative share" of
responsibility).
321. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 8 (2000); see RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A cmt. h (1979).
322. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 8 (2000).
323. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000).
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have been invoked by courts, 32 4 but virtually any factor a lawyer can
think of has been utilized, and no single factor is determinative. 3 25
In RCRA contribution claims, courts should look to equity, common
law and CERCLA and strive to allocate responsibilities for the
cleanup and its costs based on what seems fair and equitable under
the circumstances of the case. The many CERCLA cases regarding
equitable factors and allocation should serve as helpful guidance and
precedent for courts allocating RCRA cleanup responsibilities.
B. Orphan Shares
Where a defendant is jointly and severally liable to plaintiff, the
risk posed by so-called "orphan shares"-i.e., the equitable shares of
non-parties who are insolvent or otherwise unavailable-traditionally
falls upon the defendant rather than the plaintiff.326 That is, al-
though other non-parties may also be subject to liability, plaintiff can
obtain the entire relief against the defendant, and even though the
defendant may have a right of contribution, he may end up paying
more than his equitable share if the other responsible non-parties are
insolvent or cannot be located. The traditional rationale for joint and
several liability is that it makes more sense to impose the risk of or-
phan shares upon the culpable defendant rather than the innocent
plaintiff.3 2 7 Where there are multiple original defendants, the orphan
shares can be distributed among the various liable defendants, in ac-
cordance with their respective equitable shares.328
The traditional rationale for joint and several liability, however,
does not hold where the claimant also is a responsible party. In the
past, the common law doctrine of contributory negligence provided
that any degree of liability by the plaintiff could deny plaintiff recov-
ery.3 29 The modern trend, though, is toward comparative responsibil-
324. In 1980 during Congress' consideration of the bill that would become CERCLA,
then-Representative Al Gore proposed that the following factors be considered
when allocating response costs among liable parties: (i) the ability of the party to
demonstrate that its contribution to the contamination can be distinguished; (ii)
the amount of hazardous substance involved; (iii) the degree of toxicity of hazard-
ous substance involved; (iv) the degree of involvement by the party in the genera-
tion, transportation, treatment, storage or disposal of the hazardous substance;
(v) the degree of care exercised by the party; and (vi) the degree of cooperation by
the party with government officials to prevent harm to public health or the envi-
ronment. 126 CONG. REC. 26779, 26781 (Sept. 23, 1980).
325. See, e.g., Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1998); United
States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (E.D. Ark. 1999).
326. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 10 cmt. a
(2000).
327. Id.
328. HysON, supra note 65, at 262 .
329. See PROSSER, supra note 149, § 65, at 306.
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ity, whereby the plaintiffs recovery is reduced by plaintiffs equitable
share. 33o
Under CERCLA, judges have largely adopted the same paradigm.
Governmental plaintiffs or innocent private plaintiffs get the benefit
of joint and several liability, whereas plaintiffs who are responsible
parties traditionally have not been entitled to assert joint and several
liability under CERCLA.331 However, the Supreme Court's recent
ruling in Atlantic Research casts some doubt on the unavailability of
joint and several liability to a plaintiff who is a responsible party. In
ruling that a responsible party may maintain a section 107 action for
cost recovery, the Court "assume[d] without deciding that section
107(a) provides for joint and several liability," even in favor of a non-
innocent plaintiff.33 2 According to the Court, a defendant in a section
107 suit by a responsible party-plaintiff could blunt any inequitable
allocation of costs by asserting a section 113(f)(1) counterclaim, thus
triggering an equitable allocation of costs among all liable parties, in-
cluding the plaintiff.
3 33
Courts in RCRA imminent hazard cases have often ruled that the
defendant is subject to joint and several liability, even though the
statute is silent on the subject.3 34 Consistent with the Supreme
Court's approach under CERCLA in Atlantic Research, where the
plaintiff in a RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) action is a responsible party,
a court presumably could hold the defendant(s) jointly and severally
liable to plaintiff, requiring the defendant(s) to assert a counterclaim
under section 7002(a)(1)(B) in order to trigger allocation among all the
liable parties in the case, including the plaintiff.
A better alternative, though, may be for courts to find that a re-
sponsible party plaintiff in a section 7002(a)(1)(B) citizen suit is not
entitled to the benefit of joint and several liability. RCRA, of course,
does not expressly provide for joint and several liability, and the ratio-
nale for joint and several liability is not advanced where the plaintiff
also is a responsible party. Rather, courts could simply allocate re-
sponsibility among all the liable parties in the case, including the
330. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY §1 cmt. a (2000).
331. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Serv., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 169 (2004) (collecting
cases).
332. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2339 n.7 (2007).
333. Id. at 2339. Since joint and several liability is not mandated by CERCLA, a pref-
erable approach may be to make defendants in cases brought by non-innocent
plaintiffs simply severally liable. Thus, all liable parties, including the plaintiff,
would bear equitable shares, and any orphan shares could be allocated among the
plaintiff and liable defendants equitably as well.
334. See, e.g., Me. People's Alliance v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 298 (1st Cir.
2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 93 (2007); Cox v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 301
n.37 (5th Cir. 2001); Aurora Nat'l Bank v. Tri Star Mktg., Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1020,
1034 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
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plaintiff, using equitable factors. This would parallel common pre-
Aviall practice under CERCLA.335 Similarly, a defendant asserting
an implied or federal common law contribution claim, or a section
7002(a)(1)(B) suit in the nature of contribution, likewise should be en-
titled only to a judgment of several liability against the other responsi-
ble parties. 33
6
Under either alternative, the "orphan shares"-i.e., the equitable
shares of non-parties who are insolvent or otherwise unavailable-
could be distributed among the various liable parties, including the
plaintiff, in accordance with their respective equitable shares. That
is, the risk of orphan shares would fall upon all liable parties, plaintiff
and defendants.337
C. Timing/Statute of Limitations
In denying recovery of costs incurred by the plaintiff pre-complaint
under section 7002(a)(1)(B), the Meghrig Court pointed out that there
is no statute of limitations set forth in RCRA that would be applicable
to such a claim for past cost recovery.3 38 It is true that RCRA does not
contain a statute of limitations applicable to section 7003 or
7002(a)(1)(B) suits. However, both section 7003 and section
7002(a)(1)(B) contemplate suits only where the presence of waste may
present an imminent endangerment. 3 39 Accordingly, a RCRA immi-
nent hazard suit is timely only if initiated prior to the endangerment
being abated.340
Because a citizen suit claim under section 7002(a)(1)(B) must be
brought while there is still an endangerment, a claim for injunctive
relief in the nature of contribution based on the terms of section
7002(a)(1)(B) likewise would seem to be required to be initiated before
the endangerment is completely abated. That is, consistent with
Meghrig, the defendant would need to assert its section 7002(a)(1)(B)
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint relatively soon af-
335. See HYSON, supra note 65, at 261-62.
336. See United States v. Kramer, 953 F. Supp. 592, 600-01 (D.N.J. 1997) (holding
CERCLA original defendants jointly and severally liable, but third-party defend-
ants only severally liable); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF
LIABILITY § 23 (2000) (contribution-claimant can recover no more than amount
paid to plaintiff in excess of his comparative share of responsibility).
337. Cf. Kramer, 953 F. Supp. at 600-01 (orphan shares under CERCLA can be spread
among original and third-party defendants); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: AP-
PORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 11 cmt. c (2000) (suggesting a hybrid track of joint
and several liability, where orphan shares are spread among all liable parties,
including the responsible party plaintiff).
338. Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 486 (1996).
339. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(a)(1)(B), 6973(a) (2000); see Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 484-86.
340. This is certainly the teaching of Meghrig with respect to section 7002(a)(1)(B)
complaints. 516 U.S. at 484.
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ter the plaintiff commenced suit, before site conditions are abated
such that they no longer may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment. 3 41
While a section 7003 claim by the United States seemingly also
must be initiated prior to the endangerment being abated, it does not
necessarily follow that a claim for contribution, impliedly under sec-
tion 7003 or pursuant to federal common law, must be initiated while
an endangerment still exists in order to be timely. At common law,
the right to contribution did not arise until after the defendant was
found liable and he had discharged the common liability to plain-
tiff.342 So a court should not lightly require a defendant to bring a
claim for contribution at an earlier stage, absent a statutory limitation
to the contrary.
However, permitting a defendant in a section 7003 action to have
an unlimited period of time in which to assert a contribution claim
makes little sense where a plaintiff asserting a citizen suit, and a citi-
zen suit defendant asserting a claim in the nature of contribution,
must assert their section 7002(a)(1)(B) claims while an endangerment
remains. Therefore, in an effort to maintain maximum symmetry be-
tween sections 7003 and 7002(a)(1)(B) actions, and to avoid stale
claims for contribution under section 7003, courts should require a de-
fendant in both types of cases to assert his contribution claim while an
endangerment is still presented.
34 3
341. That the endangerment is eliminated during the pendency of the suit, however,
should not preclude a court from awarding contribution against other liable par-
ties. Since the award of cash contribution is simply a substitute for an order to
perform work, as long as the defendant's claim is asserted before the endanger-
ment is abated, there should be no barrier to awarding such cash contribution. A
contrary rule would serve to delay cleanups, because a defendant would want to
obtain judgment on his contribution claim before abating the endangerment. See
Gilroy Canning Co. v. Cal. Canners and Growers, 15 F. Supp. 2d 943, 945 (N.D.
Cal. 1998) (recognizing court could require defendant to pay for future cleanup
costs pursuant to RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B)); Nashua Corp. v. Norton Co., 116 F.
Supp. 2d 330 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (awarding injunctive relief requiring defendant to
pay 90% of plaintiffs future cleanup bills, even though plaintiff could not recover
past costs under RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B)); see also Randall James Butterfield,
Note, Recovering Environmental Cleanup Costs Under the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act: A Potential Solution to a Persistent Problem, 49 VAND. L. REV.
689, 744-49 (1996) (advocating that cleanup costs incurred post-complaint should
be recoverable under RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B), inter alia, to avoid cleanup de-
lays). But see Avondale Fed. Sav. Bank v. Amoco Oil Co., 170 F.3d 692 (7th Cir.
1999) (denying recovery under section 7002(a)(1)(B) of cleanup costs incurred
post-complaint).
342. PROSSER, supra note 149, § 50, at 309 (4th ed. 1971) (cause of action for contribu-
tion does not arise until payment discharging obligation to plaintiff); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A(1), (2) (1979).
343. If the United States were permitted to bring an action under section 7003 to re-
cover cleanup costs after the cleanup was completed, the timing rule proposed in
this article could prevent the defendant from seeking contribution, because the
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D. Reasonableness of Costs/What is Covered
The Court also buttressed its holding in Meghrig by stating that
CERCLA requires that response costs be reasonable in order to be re-
coverable under section 107, noting that costs recoverable under CER-
CLA must be "consistent with the national contingency plan."34 4 By
contrast, said the Meghrig Court, RCRA section 7002(a)(1)(B) does not
require a showing that the costs being sought are reasonable.
3 45
While the accuracy of the Court's statement regarding the required
reasonableness of CERCLA recoverable costs is debatable,346 its state-
ment regarding RCRA is outright misleading. Under section 7003 as
well as section 7002(a)(1)(B), a court cannot order a defendant to en-
gage in work that is unnecessary. Both sections 7003 and
7002(a)(1)(B) authorize relief only where conditions at a site may pre-
sent an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the en-
vironment. 347 A court may "restrain" a defendant or order a
defendant "to take such other action as may be necessary."3 48 There-
fore, if work were unnecessary to abate the conditions presenting the
endangerment, a plaintiff would not be able to obtain relief requiring
such work. Plus, since contribution is an equitable remedy under
RCRA's imminent hazard provisions, a court could deny contribution
where circumstances would make it inequitable or unreasonable.
349
A defendant in a RCRA section 7003 or section 7002(a)(1)(B) action
will be seeking contribution toward the relief that has been, or will be,
awarded in favor of plaintiff. Because the costs or work the defendant
has been ordered to pay or do must be "necessary," the costs the con-
tribution-plaintiff will be able to recover from the contribution-defen-
dant likewise must be "necessary" within the meaning of the statute.
endangerment already had been abated. Rather than reflecting a shortcoming of
the proposed timing rule, though, this scenario provides a further reason why the
United States should not be permitted to initiate a section 7003 action when
there no longer is an endangerment.
344. Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 486 (1996); see 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B)
(2000) (private party can recover response costs only if they are "consistent with
the national contingency plan").
345. 516 U.S. at 486.
346. CERCLA does not specify that response costs must be reasonable in order to be
recoverable. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (2000). Although the National Contin-
gency Plan includes "cost effective" as one of the factors to be considered in select-
ing a remedy, 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(ii)(D), courts have held that the United
States may recover response costs irrespective whether they are reasonable. See,
e.g., United States v. Amtreco, Inc., 846 F. Supp. 1578 (M.D. Ga. 1994); United
States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1528 (E.D. Cal. 1992); United
States v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 786 F. Supp. 152 (D.R.I. 1992).
347. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972(a)(1)(B), 6973(a) (2000).
348. Id.
349. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A cmts. c, d (1979).
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E. Contribution Protection
Issues pertaining to the effects of a settlement by plaintiff with less
than all jointly and severally liable defendants have bedeviled courts
and litigants at common law and under CERCLA.350 Perhaps most
significantly, does the settlement cut off contribution claims against
the settling defendant by the non-settling defendants?
A responsible party's incentive to settle with a plaintiff is dimin-
ished if the settler could thereafter be subject to a contribution action
by the non-settling defendants. If the settler makes a favorable settle-
ment in the sense that he pays less to plaintiff than what would be his
equitable share, he may still have to pay the difference to the non-
settlers in a subsequent contribution action.3 51 Even if the contribu-
tion action by non-settlers is unsuccessful, the settler is still subject to
the time, expense and aggravation of defending a lawsuit-the avoid-
ance of which may have been a prime motive for settling with plaintiff
in the first place. When Congress added section 113(f) to CERCLA in
1986, an express "contribution protection" provision was included in
section 113(f)(2).352 Persons who settle with the United States or a
state in an administrative or judicially approved settlement resolving
CERCLA liability "shall not be liable for claims for contribution re-
garding matters addressed in the settlement."353 Thus, responsible
parties could settle with the government, secure in the knowledge that
they would be protected from future contribution suits by non-settling
responsible parties.
In Atlantic Research, however, the Court restricted the scope of
section 113(f)(2)'s contribution protection. The Court, focusing on the
term "claims for contribution," ruled that section 113(f)(2) only pro-
tected settlers from "contribution" claims under CERCLA section
113(f) and did not protect settlers from cost recovery actions brought
by responsible parties under section 107. 354 Thus, under the Court's
interpretation, parties who settle with the government at a site may
nevertheless be sued by other non-settling responsible parties, at least
350. See PROSSER, supra note 149, § 50, at 309; City & County of Denver v. Adolph
Coors Co., 829 F. Supp. 340 (D. Colo. 1993) (discussing, as result of plaintiffs
settlement with less than all defendants in CERCLA case, whether to bar non-
settlers from suing settlers and how to credit the settlements against plaintiffs
potential recovery against non-settlers). If the defendants are subject to only sev-
eral liability, a settlement with one defendant will not impact the liability of the
remaining defendants, because each defendant is liable for just its equitable
share. HYsON, supra note 65, at 268-69. A defendant which is merely severally
liable has no claim for contribution. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTION-
MENT OF LIABILITY § 11 cmt. c (2000).
351. See, e.g., McDermott v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1994).
352. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(2) (2000).
353. Id.
354. United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S. Ct. 2331, 2339 (2007).
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for cleanup costs incurred by the non-settlers themselves. 355 That the
non-settlers' claim may be functionally equivalent to contribution-
i.e., liable parties seeking to require another liable party to pay its fair
share of the common cleanup liability-made no difference to the At-
lantic Research Court. The Court opined that "this supposed loophole"
would not discourage settlements, inter alia, because courts evaluat-
ing equitable factors would consider the prior settlement.356 While
undoubtedly true, the settling party still may be required to defend
another CERCLA lawsuit.
RCRA, not surprisingly, has no express contribution protection
provision. However, this does not mean that a responsible party who
settles with the United States will be subject to a potential contribu-
tion action by non-settlers. RCRA provides courts with broad equita-
ble powers to fashion remedies, which should include the power to
issue orders barring settling defendants from further suit by non-set-
tling defendants. Bar orders are not uncommon in actions under other
federal statutes which lack express contribution protection
provisions.3 57
VII. CONCLUSION
Courts have almost universally refused to recognize a right to con-
tribution for defendants in suits brought under RCRA's imminent haz-
ard provisions. This Article shows that, especially in light of the
Supreme Court's decision last year in Atlantic Research addressing al-
location of cleanup costs among responsible parties under CERCLA,
355. If the other responsible parties had reimbursed the government for cleanup costs
the government incurred, an action to recover those reimbursed costs would be in
the nature of a contribution action and hence barred by section 113(f)(2). See id.
at 2338-39.
356. Id. at 2339.
357. See, e.g., Franklin v. Kaypro Corp. 884 F. 2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1989) (issuing order
barring non-settling defendants from seeking contribution from settling defend-
ants in class action suit under Securities Exchange Act).
Indeed, the controversy over bar orders is not their propriety, but rather how
the settlement affects the amount of liability of the non-settling defendants. It is
generally agreed that non-settling defendants subject to joint and several liability
are entitled to a credit when the plaintiff settles with one of the liable defendants.
There is a divergence of views, though, about how the credit should be deter-
mined. Most jurisdictions, and federal common law, follow one of two modern
approaches: (a) pro tanto, which reduces the non-settling defendants' liability by
the actual settlement amount paid by the settling defendant to plaintiff; or (b)
proportionate share, which reduces the non-settling defendants' liability by the
equitable share of the settling defendant. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 886A cmt. m (1979); McDermott v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202 (1994) (admiralty).
The pro tanto approach is embraced by the UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG
TORTFEASORS ACT (UCATA), 12 ULA 185-290 (1996) (1955 Revised Act), while
the UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT (UCFA), 12 ULA 123-53 (1996) follows the
proportionate share alternative.
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their refusals to recognize contribution in RCRA imminent hazard
cases are erroneous, resulting from cramped and mechanical interpre-
tations of Supreme Court precedents, flawed comparisons to CER-
CLA, and disregard for the expansive remedial language, purpose and
equitable and common law roots of sections 7003 and 7002(a)(1)(B).
Courts can and should recognize (1) a contribution claim for defend-
ants in RCRA section 7003 cases, arising by implication and under
federal common law, and (2) a claim in the nature of contribution for
defendants in RCRA imminent hazard citizen suits, based on the ex-
press terms of section 7002(a)(1)(B). Such contribution claims are con-
sistent with the terms of the statute and Congressional intent, and
they will promote fairness, settlements and private cleanups.
Finally, in adjudicating these contribution claims in RCRA sec-
tions 7003 and 7002(a)(1)(B) cases, courts should look for guidance not
only to the terms of the statute, but also to the equitable and common
law principles on which the statutory provisions are based, as well as
practice and precedents under analogous CERCLA provisions, to ad-
dress such important issues as how cleanup costs should be allocated
among the responsible parties, the timing and scope of such claims,
and the effects of settlements with less than all responsible parties.
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